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INTRODUCTION
Society's interest in establishing the paternity of children is not
new. For centuries, it has been driven by the desire to provide support
for children without making excessive demands on the public coffers and
the hope of reducing the incidence of irresponsible procreative behavior.
In recent years, the desire to provide children with complete genetic his-
tories for medical purposes and to allow children and their fathers the
psychological and social benefits of a relationship have also fueled an
interest in establishing paternity.
What is new, of course, is the ability to conclusively determine ge-
netic paternity through deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") testing.2 This
process, often used to determine paternity in order to establish child sup-
port obligations or to ground a man's right to a parental relationship with
a child, is used increasingly to disestablish paternity. Courts and legisla-
tures are struggling with the issue of paternity disestablishment. 3 The
puzzles of paternity have led some courts to make bizarre blunders,
reaching conclusions that are both legally and morally unacceptable.
The problems arising in legislative and judicial discussions of pater-
nity establishment and disestablishment are difficult and many of the dis-
cussions surrounding these issues have not been illuminating. At an
abstract level, the core issue is often framed as one of determining what
makes a man the real father.4 I contend that this way of framing the
problem is part of the problem, part of the reason the puzzles of paternity
remain unresolved. As is often the case, society has difficulty answering
a question because it asks the wrong question. The difficulties in an-
swering the question do not disappear when the question is framed cor-
rectly; genuine disagreements will remain. Framing the question
properly, however, is an essential precondition to answering it.
2 Comment, Who is My Daddy? Using DNA to Help Resolve Post-Death Paternity
Cases, 8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 151, 154, 159-65 (1997) (noting the effectiveness of DNA
testing as compared to previously used methods).
3 See discussion infra Part III.
4 Usually when "father" is qualified by "real," the intent is to identify the biological
father (for a discussion of the complexity of the notion of biological fatherhood itself, see infra
p. 61). This use, with its suggestion that biology determines fatherhood, has probably led to
the framing of the debate in the unhelpful terms of who is the real father. Mary B. Mahowald
takes up the issue directly:
A real mother, then, is first and foremost a woman who cares for a child, from any
stage of development, until the child no longer needs that care. A real father is a
man who does the same when he can, i.e., after the child is born .... From the
standpoint of gender equality, it is hard to see how genetic ties alone ever provide an
adequate for defining real mothers or real fathers.
Mary B. Mahowald, Genes, Clones, and Gender Equality, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 495,
526 (2000) (emphasis in original).
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This article does not attempt to solve the social and legal problems
of paternity establishment and disestablishment. Instead, it attempts to
set the discussion on a more productive course by separating and clarify-
ing the various questions that are confounded in the apparently simple
question, "Who's your daddy?"
In Part I, I discuss the importance of paternity establishment and
disestablishment. In Part II, I briefly address the history of legal ap-
proaches to this issue in the Anglo-American tradition. In addition, I
also offer a snapshot of the current, rapidly changing legal landscape on
this issue in Part III. In Part IV, I examine the concept of paternity. I
argue that the current common sense understanding of paternity no
longer serves our society well for many of its purposes. The concept of
paternity is complex, comprising many separable elements; these ele-
ments must be separated in the abstract because they are increasingly
being separated in reality. The separation of the various elements of pa-
ternity makes it completely natural to talk of children having multiple,
though clearly nonfungible, fathers. Based on the conceptual parsing of
paternity, I address various questions concerning paternity establishment
and disestablishment. The concept of paternal rights and responsibilities
is complex, like the concept of paternity itself. The normative philo-
sophical problem of paternity involves linking the individual elements of
paternal rights and responsibilities correctly to the individual elements of
the concept of paternity. Part V looks at the possible concept of multiple
fathers, and the issues of paternal rights this concept may invoke in prac-
tice. Finally in Part VI, I suggest how the exercise of this article lays a
foundation for addressing the pressing social, legal, and political ques-
tions concerning paternity more productively.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF FATHERS
Parentage determination does more than provide genea-
logical clues to a child's background; it establishes fun-
damental emotional, social, legal[,] and economic ties
between parent and child. It is a prerequisite to secur-
ing financial support for the child and to developing the
heightened emotional support the child derives from en-
forceable custody and visitation rights. Parentage de-
termination also unlocks the door to government-
provided dependent's benefits, inheritance, and an accu-
rate medical history for the child.5
5 U.S. COMM'N ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 120 (1992).
2003]
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Why is paternity establishment important? There are many reasons,
grounded in a variety of interests. To bring some semblance of order to
this issue, I divide the interests into personal and social interests and
make a variety of distinctions within each of these classes. This primary
division undoubtedly is somewhat arbitrary since, on any plausible ac-
count, social interests are grounded in personal interests. Still, it is a
useful way to begin.
A. PERSONAL INTERESTS
Among the personal interests that prompt a desire to establish pater-
nity are those of the two primary players: the child and the father. Third
parties, notably, but not exclusively, the mother, also have interests in
paternity establishment. Grandparents, half-siblings, aunts, uncles, and
other members of the extended family may have interests in establishing
paternity. Even full siblings may have such an interest, for they may
otherwise suffer under the mistaken conception that they are not full sib-
lings. With the exception of one special third party, I will focus prima-
rily on the interests of the father and the child. The exception is for a
putative father who is not the biological father; this article will discuss
the benefits of paternity establishment that might accrue to him. I do not
intend this focus, however, to suggest that these are the only relevant
personal interests.
Among the personal interests, it is useful to specifically cite these
interests: medical, financial, emotional, and developmental. Certainly
there are others that are important, and those listed-especially the latter
two-are not always clearly distinguishable. Nevertheless, this partial
list will serve our purposes.
1. Medical Interests
With the growing ability to diagnose and treat genetically based and
genetically influenced diseases, having access to information about one's
genetic heritage is increasingly important.6 Individuals who lack the
medical history of both parents are at a disadvantage in the diagnosis and
treatment of a variety of diseases compared to those who possess such
6 [T]he compilation of a thorough family history remains the first step for genetic
counseling in any situation where a hereditary disorder is suspected. It is virtually
impossible to establish an accurate hereditary cancer syndrome diagnosis and, in
turn, to determine a given patient's risk for cancer, without knowing how this dis-
ease is manifested in his or her family.
Henry T. Lynch & Jane Lynch, Genetic Counseling for Hereditary Cancer, 10 ONCOLOGY 27
(1996); see also Alka Srivastava et al., Risk of Breast and Ovarian Cancer in Women with
Strong Family Histories, 15 ONCOLOGY 889 (2001) ("Assessing the risk of breast and ovarian
cancer starts with obtaining a complete and accurate family history .... [A]n accurate family
history continues to be the most informative tool for assessing cancer risk.").
[Vol. 13:29
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information. 7 Those who have a false belief about the identity of their
genetic father are further disadvantaged: they lack knowledge of their
true genetic ancestry, hold false beliefs about it, and are generally una-
ware of their ignorance and false beliefs. For their entire lives, they may
unwittingly be giving doctors false information with potentially lethal
consequences. Children receive a clear medical benefit from paternity
establishment based simply on the increased knowledge of their genetic
endowment. Those who deny a person the right to knowledge of his
genetic ancestry-or, worse, mislead him about it-are harming the per-
son in ways that could result in the needless death of that person.
The child's medical interest in the establishment of paternity is not
simply limited to the genetic predisposition towards disease. Should ill-
ness or injury necessitate an organ replacement, genetic relatives are the
best candidates for donors. 8 Consequently, children whose paternity has
not been established are disadvantaged because their pool of potential
donors is reduced. In addition, since the likelihood of organ donation
presumably is increased when parents and children are tied to one an-
other by bonds of affection-rather than the relatively sterile cognitive
consciousness of genetic relatedness-children have an interest, based on
the possibility of organ donation, in the early establishment of paternity
and fostering a parent/child relationship with their genetic father
throughout their lives.9
7 See generally Lynch & Lynch, supra note 6.
8 Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable
Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 57
n.93 (1995). Early in medical transplant history, organ transplants were limited to organs
harvested from blood relatives in an attempt to genetically "match" the tissue, allowing for a
better prognosis of the patient. Id. Identical twins were believed to be the best match, usually
having a 90% success rate. Id. Developments in immunosuppressive drugs have made it
possible to now expand the availability of organ donation beyond blood relatives to third
parties who have a high degree of consanguinity or histocompatibility with the donee. Id. at
57.
9 Although never legally challenged, the state has no legal authority to require a parent
to contribute more to a child than financial support, such as an organ, for the benefit of his
child. See Holden v. Holden, 957 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (D. Ka. 1997) (finding no legal duty for
a parent to provide "emotional support"). Courts generally would view this type of involun-
tary intrusion on the body by the state as a violation of constitutional fights. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851, 898 (1992) (holding that the mother has a liberty
interest while pregnant that a father cannot take away); cf Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759
(1985) ("A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence, however, im-
plicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be
'unreasonable' even if likely to produce evidence of a crime"); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 174 (1952) ("Every individual [has the right] to the possession and control of this own
person, free from all restraint of interference of others."). In recent years, however, many
states have passed organ donation laws that automatically presume consent for harvesting of
organs after death, an issue that implicates archaic laws of property granting ownership of the
body to next of kin, not the decedent's constitutional rights. Alexander Powhida, Comment,
2003]
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This latter benefit can, and sometimes does, flow in the opposite
direction. There have been numerous cases of adult children donating
organs to their parents. 10 In these cases, the parents clearly had a medi-
cal interest in knowing their genetic children and, most likely, in having
the opportunity to establish a typical parent-child relationship with them.
The establishment of genetic paternity has benefits for both fathers
and children with respect to their reproductive choices. Fathers may well
benefit from having genetic information about their children. A man
who knows that he sired a child with a genetic illness may choose to alter
his procreative behavior in the future. He may alter it by preventing
conception or encouraging in utero testing of the fetus to aid the decision
of terminating the pregnancy, seeking prenatal treatment, or preparing to
rear a child with a genetic disability. Obviously, if paternity is not estab-
lished and the father does not learn about the existence and medical con-
dition of his child, he is disadvantaged in planning his reproductive life
and preparing for his future children's possible medical problems.I' Al-
ternatively, when paternity is misattributed, the putative father, in the
mistaken belief that he carries a genetic illness, unnecessarily may
choose not to father a child.
An additional benefit of genetic paternity establishment concerns
the procreative plans of the child. A child's lack of knowledge regarding
her genetic history may lead her to procreate when, had she known that
history, she would have chosen otherwise. If paternity is misattributed,
she may choose not to procreate in the false belief that she carries a
genetic illness. Furthermore, if an individual's genetic paternity is not
established correctly, she or he may marry and have children with an
individual who is more closely related genetically than is desirable. 12
Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed Consent to Organ Donation Laws of Various States
and the United States Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 349, 363, 368, 370 (1999).
10 See, e.g., Eric P. Cohen et al., Benefit of Child-to-Parent Kidney Donation, 3 AM. J.
TRANSPLANTATION 865 (2003); Susanne Quick, Study Backs Child-Donor Transplants, MIL-
WAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 7, 2003, at GI; L. Westlie, et al., Quality of Life in Norwegian
Kidney Donors, 8 NEPHROLOGY DIALYSIS TRANSPLANTATION 1146 (1993).
1 1 Furthermore, a future child could be disadvantaged if his father is, as a result of mis-
identified or unidentified paternity, unaware that he carries a genetic disease. This is true
independent of the controversial issue of whether a child can ever be wronged by being born.
The possibility of in utero surgery and other relatively new medical treatments may make it
possible to cure or ameliorate the effects of genetic illness if they are known or suspected
during fetal development. See, e.g., M. Meuli et al., In Utero Surgery Rescues Neurological
Function at Birth in Sheep with Spina Bifida, I NAT. MED. 342 (1995); Catherine A. Mazzola
et al., Dermoid Inclusion Cysts and Early Spinal Cord Tethering after Fetal Surgery for My-
elomeningocele, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 256 (2002); Nancy Humphrey, Spina-Bifida Babies
Prospering After In Utero Surgery At VUMC, VANDERBILT REGISTER, Mar. 22-28, 1999,
available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/News/register/Mar22_99/babies.htm (last visited Oct.
4, 2003).
12 Individuals often avoid marriage with close relatives because of the increased possibil-
ity of the transmission of genetic defects. While the likelihood of such problems has been
[Vol. 13:29
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Conversely, she or he may unnecessarily forgo marriage to an individual
in the mistaken belief that the relationship is too genetically close for
safety in having children.' 3
2. Financial Interests
Almost too obvious to need to be stated, but clearly too important to
be omitted, is the financial interest children have in establishing pater-
nity. The father's economic resources, which often exceed the mother's,
provide a crucial benefit for children, frequently making the difference
between a life of poverty and a comfortable, if not opulent, existence.
In 2000, 32.5% of single mother households with children were be-
low the poverty level, compared with only 16.1% of single father house-
holds with children and only 6% of married couple households with
children under the age of eighteen.' 4 When parents live apart, fathers'
financial contributions are important. A 1997 survey of children living
apart from one parent revealed that 52.8% of children living with their
mothers received financial support from their nonresident fathers and
that 38.6% of children living with their fathers received financial support
from their nonresident mothers.15 In the same year, 23.1% of those chil-
dren living with their mothers with an existent child support order re-
ceived all their ordered child support from their nonresident father, while
only 6.1% of those living with their fathers received all the ordered child
support from their nonresident mothers. 16
In fiscal year 2000, the Administration for Children and Families of
the Department of Health and Human Services reported national collec-
tions of child support in the amount of $17.9 billion-the overwhelming
exaggerated in the case of cousins, it is real and significantly greater with close relatives. See
generally MARTIN OTrENHEIMER, FORBIDDEN RELATIVES: THE AMERICAN MYTH OF COUSIN
MARRIAGE (1996).
13 The following story illustrates both problems: Janet, a young woman, comes home and
joyfully announces to her parents that she is going to marry an attractive young man named
Jason. Later that evening, Janet's father takes her aside and reluctantly tells her that she must
not marry Jason. He confesses to his daughter that, years ago, he had a brief affair with
Jason's mother and that Jason is actually Janet's half-brother. Janet is heartbroken and de-
spondent. Her mother is very concerned about her change in mood and encourages Janet to
talk about what is bothering her. Finally, Janet confides in her mother, tearfully recounting
what her father has told her. Her mother pauses, smiles and says, "Go ahead and marry Jason.
Jason may be your dad's son, but he's not your half-brother."
14 U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty Status of Families, by Type of Family, Presence of Re-
lated Children, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1959 To 2001, (2002), at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov4.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2003).
15 Elaine Sorensen & Chava Zibmann, To What Extent do Children Benefit From Child
Support?, ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM: DISCUSSION PAPERS 99-19, Urban Inst., Jan.
2000, at 11, 99-110, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/discussion99-19.pdf;
see also W. V. Fabricius, S. L. Braver, & K. Deneau, Divorced Parents' Financial Support of
Their Children's College Expenses, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 224, 224-41 (2003).
16 Id.
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majority of these payments came from nonresident fathers. 17 Moreover,
these figures vastly underestimate the actual amount of financial support
nonresident fathers provide for their children. First, these figures only
count child support transfer payments made through child support en-
forcement agencies. 18 Fathers living apart from their children may trans-
fer money to support children to the mother without a court order. 19
Furthermore, some parents pay child support pursuant to a child support
order but not through a child support enforcement agency. 20 Second, the
national child support figures do not include the direct support nonresi-
dent fathers provide for their children. 21 Needless to say, the amount of
money one parent pays to the other parent through a child support en-
forcement agency is not a measure of all financial support that a parent
provides for his children.
There is reason to believe that financial support for children is more
consistently and generously given when there are bonds of affection be-
tween the parent and the child. This is one plausible explanation for the
fact that child support obligors who have shared custody of their children
are far more compliant with child support orders than those who only
have visitation rights, and that those with visitation rights are far more
compliant than those who are deprived of the opportunity to see their
children. 22 As with the medical interest in organ donations, these facts
argue for early paternity establishment and support for parent-child rela-
17 ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
FY 2000 PRELIMINARY DATA PREVIEW REPORT, 3.6 TOTAL COLLECTIONS (2001), available at
http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/2000/datareport/chO3.html#N79AI (last visited
Aug. 28, 2003) (hereinafter, ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES).
18 See id.
19 Evidence of such payments taking place is strongly implied by statutes such as the
following Ohio statute: "Any payment of money by the person responsible for the support
payments under a support order to the person entitled to receive the support payments that is
not made to the office of child support, or to the child support enforcement agency administer-
ing the support order under sections 3125.27 to 3125.30 of the Revised Code, shall not be
considered a payment of support under the support order and, unless the payment is made to
discharge an obligation other than support, shall be deemed to be a gift. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3121.45 (2003). Furthermore, cases decided pursuant to this statute include findings
that such payments have taken place. Thottam v. Thottam, No. 1995CA00332, 1996 Ohio
App. LEXIS 2884, at *7-8 (Ohio 5th Ct. App. May 20, 1996).
20 E-mail from Kim Newsom Bridges, Esq., Executive Director, Ohio Child Support
Directors Association to Donald C. Hubin, Professor, Ohio State University, (Oct. 23, 2003,
09:05:33 CDT) (on file with the Comell Journal of Law and Public Policy) (noting that the
federal reports are only compilations of collections only made through state and local agencies,
and fail to collect information on payments made by fathers outside of collection agencies).
21 See Admin. for Children and Families, supra note 18.
22 In 1999, for fathers with joint custody and visitation agreements, 85.9% of child sup-
port due was paid; for fathers without custody, but with visitation agreements, 77% of child
support due was paid; for fathers with neither custody nor visitation agreements, only 46.3% of
child support due was paid. Figures calculated from U.S. Census Bureau Table 9, 2, available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/childsupport/chldsu99.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
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tionships with both parents. Paternity identification also allows children
to inherit from their fathers and to receive "third party benefits" such as
life insurance benefits, veterans' benefits and social security benefits. 23
All of these financial benefits accrue to the child. In the past, the
economic benefits of establishing paternity flowed primarily in the other
direction. Children were economic assets, providing efficient and low-
cost labor for family farms.2 4 Young children, however, no longer pro-
vided an economic benefit to their parents, and while many factors weigh
in favor of having children, sound economic investment does not seem to
be among them. Yet, while the economic advantages of children may
not be apparent to those paying for braces and contemplating college
tuition costs, there are still some significant economic advantages to pro-
creation. Due to steep increases in the costs of providing elder care,
more and more elderly people need to rely on their children for economic
support during the last years of their lives.2 5
Children certainly have an economic interest in paternity establish-
ment. Fathers may have an economic interest in knowing who their chil-
dren are. Moreover, putative fathers who are not the biological fathers
have an economic interest in the disestablishment of paternity.
3. Emotional Interests
Both parents and children typically have strong emotional interests
in their relationship with one another. In the best of circumstances, this
relationship is among life's most fulfilling relationships for both parents
and children, even if the children are not aware of it until later in life.
Many adults, especially those involved in setting public policy, are
likely to focus on the adverse economic consequences of divorce for
children. In contrast, children, even grown children of parents who di-
vorced when they were young, are likely to consider the loss of a rela-
tionship with one of their parents, usually the father, as a greater
consequence.2 6 This fact speaks to the emotional interest children have
in relationships with their fathers. 27 Conversely for most fathers, the re-
23 See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, PATERNITY Es-
TABLISHMENT, available at http://www.csed.dc.gov/collect.shtm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
24 Drew D. Hansen, The American Invention of Child Support: Dependency and Punish-
ment in Early American Child Support Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1123, 1129, 1132 (1999).
25 Alan C. Weinstein, Essay, The Challenge of Providing Adequate Housing for the Eld-
erly... Along with Everyone Else, I I J.L. & HEALTH 133, 134-35 (1996-97).
26 JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN,
AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 238 (1989).
27 Wallerstein describes the overwhelming sadness of children of divorced parents
who taught us very early that to be separated from their father was intolerable. The
poignancy of their reaction is astounding. .... They cry for their daddies-be they
good, bad, or indifferent daddies. I have been deeply struck by the distress children
of every age suffer at losing their fathers.
2003]
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lationship with their children is of enormous personal value. The impor-
tance of a man's relationship with his children is exemplified in a variety
of links between this relationship and his physical and psychological
health.
"[A] man's life as a father is central, not peripheral, to his health. ' 28
In fact, a variety of problems with men's physical health (including fa-
tigue, sleeplessness, back problems and more) increase with worries
about their children and their parenting relationship with their children. 29
Their relationship with their children also affects their psychological
well-being. 30 Perhaps surprisingly, worries about their children and their
parent-child relationship with them proved a greater hindrance to job per-
formance for men than for women.3' Apparently, men demonstrated less
ability than women to "compartmentalize" and leave their worries about
their children outside of the office. 32
Men's concerns with their children and their status as a father often
begin before the birth of the child. A surprising number of expectant
fathers, "especially those who are involved in committed relationships"
with the mothers, experience couvade syndrome. 33 This set of symptoms
mimics, in some ways, the experiences of pregnancy. 34 Estimates of the
frequency of couvade syndrome vary from 11% to 65% of expectant
fathers.35
Id. at 234.
28 Caryl Rivers & Rosalind Barnett, Fathers Do Best: Why Dedicated Dads are Usually
Healthier and Happier, WASH. POST, June 20, 1993, at C5.
29 Id.
30 See generally Rosalind Barnett et al., Men's Multiple Roles and Their Relationship to
Men's Psychological Distress, 54 J. MARRAIGE & FAM. 358, 358-67 (1992); see also Rosalind
Barnett & Nancy Marshall, Men, Family Role, Job Role Quality, and Physical Health, I
HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 48, 48-55 (1993).
31 See Kirby Deater-Deckard et al., The New Property, 5 PSYCHOLOGICAL Sci. 341, 345
(1994) (finding that fathers reported similar levels of separation anxiety as mothers and
slightly higher levels of concern for their children in day care facilities). The authors found
that fathers tended to overestimate their wives' concerns; the authors believe this occurs be-
cause it is "socially more acceptable for mothers' anxieties about children's well-being to
exceed fathers' than for fathers' anxieties to exceed mothers." ld. Fathers know how anxious
they feel themselves, and they may adjust their perceptions of their wives' concerns to exceed
their own, regardless of mothers' actual level of anxiety. Id. See also Rivers & Barnett, supra
note 28, at C5.
32 There is a growing body of research that supports the conclusion that men's satisfac-
tion with their parenting role is central to their physical and emotional health. See Rivers &
Barnett, supra note 28, at C5; see also Barnett et al., supra note 31, at 358-67; Barnett &
Marshall, supra note 31, at 48-55.
33 MARSIGLIO, supra note 1, at 23.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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Divorced men are nearly ten times more likely to commit suicide
than divorced women. 36 Interestingly, divorced mothers are about ten
times more likely to have primary physical custody of their children. 37
In light of the connection between a father's relationship with his chil-
dren and his physical and emotional health, it would be naive to think
these two statistics are unrelated.
The emotional importance of the father-child relationship to both
fathers and children depends on the existence of a developed relation-
ship. While it might not be immediately obvious how this bears on the
issue of paternity establishment, the fact that such an emotionally impor-
tant relationship is possible between fathers and their children serves as
the basis for recognizing a "future interest" that both have in the estab-
lishment of paternity. There is, however, reason to believe that the cor-
rect establishment of paternity also has immediate emotional benefits for
both fathers and their children.
Undoubtedly, many people have a profound and compelling desire
to learn about their genetic ancestry, as exemplified by the enduring pop-
ularity of genealogy. In addition, there is a strong movement among
adoptees to secure the right to know the identity of their genetic par-
ents. 38 Individuals produced by artificial insemination by a donor are
also challenging laws that prevent them from learning the identity of
their genetic fathers. 39 Many of these individuals write poignantly of the
36 See Augustine J. Kposawa, Divorce and Suicide Risk, 57 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY.
HEALTH 559, 559-60 (2003); see also C. H. Cantor and P. J. Slater, Marital Breakdown,
Parenthood, and Suicide, 1 J. FAM. STUDIES 91, 91-102 (1995).
37 Joanne Byfield, Irreconcilable Differences, THE REPORT, Jan. 6, 2003, at 30, available
at http://www.fathersforlife.orglarticles/report/irreconcilable.htm.
38 See generally TIM J. WATTS, THE RIGHTS OF ADOPTEES To KNow THEIR BIOLOGICAL
PARENTS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1988).
39 David Gollancz, a British attorney and activist for the rights of such individuals, and a
product of "artificial insemination by donor" himself, writes
Human beings are storytelling animals. We make sense of the world and ourselves
by telling stories.... Our storytelling is not only a social and cultural activity. We
ourselves embody a narrative. Sperm is not just fertiliser [sic]: it is a book, in which
is written half the recipe for a new human being. When my donor's sperm fertilised
[sic] my mother's egg, he ensured that his genes were passed on, to me. Most peo-
ple would accept that an individual's personal development is the story of the inter-
action of genetic predisposition with environment. And there are kinds of genetic
inheritance which have nothing to do with personal mythology: recessive genes for
incurable diseases are not susceptible to interpretation. . . .We need to recognise
[sic] a human right that would not only benefit the offspring of assisted reproduction
and adoptees, but would prevent all those other eradications of inconvenient personal
history: such as the export of children to Canada and Australia or the theft of aborig-
inal children .... This right, like any authentic human right, would not only benefit
those individuals who assert it but should be seen as one of the conditions of a
decent society. It is the right not to be deliberately deceived about our essential
personal history.
David Gollancz, Give Me My Own History, THE GUARDIAN (London) May 20, 2002, at 18.
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desire to know who their genetic parents and other blood-relatives are.40
Richard P. Perna points out that, with respect to paternity establishment,
[M]ore than economics are at stake for a child. Emo-
tional and psychological well-being often depend upon a
sense of identity and family history derived from both
parents. Given the importance of the parent-child rela-
tionship to the future psychological and emotional health
of the child, it is imperative to establish that relationship
with the real father-not just any man capable of provid-
ing economic support.4 1
Genetic fathers probably do not seek out their missing children as
frequently as children seek out their genetic parents. There are a variety
of plausible explanations for this occurrence. The first two deal with
asymmetries between the situation of fathers and children. First, an epi-
stemic asymmetry: children always know that they have two genetic par-
ents, whereas fathers may not know that they have genetic children. At
least sometimes, fathers may fail to seek out their genetic children be-
cause they do not know that these children exist.42 Second, the identity
of genetic children with whom one does not share a life probably does
not have the influence on one's sense of self-who one is and where one
originates-as much as the identity of one's genetic parents has. Finally,
fathers may be unlikely to seek out their genetic children because once
such a genetic relation is established, it will almost certainly result in a
40 David Gollancz, in another article describes his joy at finding two half-siblings-
products of the same sperm donor as himself:
I have found two half-siblings: children of the same donor father but of a different
mother.... [W]hat doubts I have had about the profound significance of blood ties,
their importance in the story-telling that is as much the stuff of life as the events it
recounts, are gone now. We are three people in middle age.... [F]or me the discov-
ery of these two has been like the warming of frozen soil after a hard winter, bring-
ing growth and green into places that have seemed dead and desolate for 30 years
and more. For all three of us, the delight we feel in each other's company, and our
certainty about the importance of our connection with each other, have a strength,
immediacy and simplicity that is like a taste in the mouth: something known before
and beyond the need for discussion. This meeting has brought me great joy-and an
even greater certainty about the need for an end to secrecy in [donor insemination
cases].
David Gollancz, Donor Insemination: A Question of Rights, 4 HUMAN FERTILITY 164, 167
(2001).
41 Richard P. Perna, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and the De-
fense of Non-Paternity: A Functional Analysis, 73 Ky. L.J. 76, 99 (1984-85).
42 Often, this is because the mothers conceal the existence of these children from the
fathers. Except in extraordinary situations, mothers are not in the same epistemic situation as
fathers. If they do not know who their genetic children are, it is seldom because they do not
know that they have children. More importantly, when mothers do not know who their chil-
dren are, this situation is usually brought about by a voluntary decision of the mother, though
the voluntary decision may have been made in circumstances that are far from ideal.
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child support obligation but is much less likely to result in the ordinary
benefits of fatherhood, such as the opportunity to rear and care for the
children.43 So long as the establishment of paternity is merely the occa-
sion for a financial obligation, without any concomitant familial rights,
benefits, or even respect, it is not surprising that more men do not seek
their potential biological children.44
4. Developmental Interests
Children have a significant interest in paternity establishment be-
cause it can affect their development into normal, healthy adults. 45
Though much of the scientific research in this area must be treated as
provisional, it is certainly strongly suggestive of an important role that
fathers play in the development of their children when they are actively
involved in their children's lives. Some benefits of such paternal in-
volvement may be possible to reproduce with "male role models" or sur-
rogate fathers who are biologically unrelated to the child.46 However,
many of these benefits appear to be more easily and naturally produced
by genetic fathers, and surprisingly, some appear to actually require the
presence and involvement of the genetic father. 47
On average, children reared with both biological parents develop
better than children reared with only one biological parent or with neither
biological parent.48 The reasons for the difference are unclear. There is
mounting evidence to support the conclusion that the reasons for this
difference are not solely economic. 49 What role, other than economic, do
involved fathers play in their children's development?
43 See Perna, supra note 41, at 100.
44 See id. This does not mean that men do not love and support their children. Rather, it
recognizes that there are environmental triggers for the love and commitment that produces
voluntary sacrifice-a child's smile or hug, for example. It is probably unreasonable to expect
a high level of voluntary compliance with a duty to provide financial support for a child from a
father who is not allowed to be a real parent to his children. Evolution did not select for
fathers with a disposition to write child support checks-though it most certainly did for fa-
thers with a disposition to provide for and protect the children they love. See David C. Geary,
Evolution and the Human Expression of Proximate Paternal Investment, 126 PSYCHOLOGICAL
BULLETIN 55, 55-77 (2000).
45 See DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER 139-63 (1996) (discussing how fathers
can affect a child's development).
46 See Ross D. PARKE, FATHERHOOD 217-23 (1996).
47 See POPENOE, supra note 45, at 150-88. At least the genetic father's presence is re-
quired as a practical manner. Technological progress could allow us to reproduce artificially
the benefits of the genetic father's presence. Id.
48 Id. at 139.
49 Michael E. Lamb, Placing Children's Interests First: Developmentally Appropriate
Parenting Plans, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 98, 103 (2002).
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While there is controversy over the question of whether fathers play
a unique and irreplaceable role in the development of their children, 50
there appears to be evidence that, on average, men interact with infants
and children differently than women do.5' They roughhouse and engage
in physical play more than women do; they encourage risk-taking more
than women do; and they interact with infants and children in ways that
encourage more independence and self-reliance. 52 These activities ap-
pear to help children learn to be more independent and resourceful. Play,
it seems, and particularly the forms of play that fathers typically engage
in with their children, is anything but frivolous in a child's development.
Fathers also serve as a male role model for children. Good male
role models are important in the development of both boys and girls. 53
Boys often emulate their fathers and girls' self-esteem is bolstered by a
good relationship with their father.54
While biological fathers typically play these roles in their children's
lives, there is nothing in what we have said so far that limits this role to
biological fathers. People often reflect this insight by talking of the im-
portance of fathers merely in terms of "male role models"-roles that
could, in principle, be played by unrelated adult males or adult male rela-
tives other than biological fathers.
The role of these men in children's lives is important. Adoptive
fathers, step-fathers, grandfathers, uncles and other men contribute in
many ways to the development of children. It seems more likely, how-
ever, that a biological father will be more interested in making the sacri-
fices to promote development of his children than will an unrelated
male.55 Among primates, humans are unique in the degree of paternal
investment in children. 56 The evolution of a high level of paternal sacri-
fice for children is, almost certainly, at least partly the result of "kin
selection," the theory that fathers who invest in their biological children
have a higher level of inclusive fitness than fathers who do not because
50 See generally Louise B. Silverstein & Carl F. Auerbach, Deconstructing the Essential
Father, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 397, 397-98 (1999) (defending the view that "neither a mother
nor a father is essential" to a child's healthy development).
51 See generally POPENOE, supra note 46, at 139-63; PARKE, supra note 48, at 63-72;
TINE THEVENIN, MOTHERING AND FATHERING: THE GENDER DIFFERENCES IN CHILD REARING
(1993) (examining the typical differences in the way fathers and mothers interact with their
children); Ross D. PARKE & ARMN A. BROTr, THROWAWAY DADS: THE MYTHS AND BARRI-
ERS THAT KEEP MEN FROM BEING THE FATHERS THEY WANT TO BE 3-13 (1999).
52 THEVENIN, supra note 51, at 86-102.
53 See generally id.
54 E.g., PARKE, supra note 46, at 149-55, 173-78.
55 See POPENOE, supra note 45, at 174-77. The obvious exception is likely to be adop-
tive fathers-men who have made a conscious choice to be social fathers to children they
know are unrelated to them. The group is highly self-selected for men who strongly desire to
rear children.
56 Id; see also, Geary, supra note 44, at 55-77.
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more of their offspring survive and thrive. 57 This theory does not settle
the issue of the mechanism for such kin selection. The proximate causes
of paternal investment are, of course, only contingently connected to ge-
netic relatedness (or, at least, were so connected through evolutionary
history). So, it is possible a priori that the psychological mechanism that
promotes paternal investment and nurturing stems from the man's attach-
ment to his sexual partner, which fosters paternal behavior toward her
children, or is triggered by the mere presence of the child in the man's
household. If either of these could fully explain paternal investment in
humans, then genetically unrelated men who were either the mother's
sexual partner (the first hypothesis) or were living with the children (the
second hypothesis) would, on average, invest as many resources in the
children as a biological father. However, these hypotheses are not ade-
quate. In particular, the significantly higher rate of child abuse by stepfa-
thers suggests that the mechanism promoting paternal investment and
nurturing does not consist only of pair-bonding with the mother or con-
tact with the children. 58
Finally, empirical evidence indicates that genetic fathers make a
unique contribution to the development of their children, one that unre-
lated males cannot make. Surprisingly, it is a contribution that requires
them simply to be present. 59 Over the past several decades, medical
57 Kin selection is an evolutionary mechanism that increases an individual's inclusive
fitness by increasing the reproductive success of genetic relatives. Although suggested by
earlier authors, the theory of kin selection was first developed by W.D. Hamilton. See gener-
ally W.D. Hamilton, Altruism and Related Phenomena, Mainly in Social Insects, 3 ANN. REV.
ECOLOGY & SYSTEMATICS 193 (1972); W.D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Altruistic Behaviour,
97 AM. NATURALIST 354 (1963); W.D. Hamilton, The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour
I, 1, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1 (1964).
58 Margo Wilson and Martin Daly write
Some have suggested that the problems characteristic of steprelationships are inci-
dental consequences of the creation of a "parent-offspring" relationship too late.
There is no evidence in favor of this idea and at least one study that speaks against it.
Flinn ... found that men who coresided with stepchildren from their births were if
anything even more hostile toward them than were those whose steprelationships
were established later, and much more so than genetic fathers. One possible impli-
cation is that human paternal affection is "cognitively penetrable" by something like
conscious knowledge of paternity or nonpaternity. (This need not imply that pater-
nal affection is insensitive to cues like phenotypic resemblances as well, without the
man's necessary awareness.)
Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Chattel, in THE ADAPTED
MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 289, 307 (Jermone H.
Barkow et al. eds., 1992).
59 See generally Bruce J. Ellis, Of Fathers and Pheromones: Implications of Cohabita-
tion for Daughters' Pubertal Timing, in JUST LIVING TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITA-
TION FOR CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND SOCIAL POLICY 161-72 (A. Booth & A.C. Crouter eds.,
2002); Bruce J. Ellis & Judy Garber, Psychosocial Antecedents of Variation in Girls' Pubertal
Timing: Maternal Depression, Stepfather Presence, and Marital and Family Stress, 71 CHILD
DEVELOPMENT, 485, 485-501; Bruce J. Ellis et al., Quality of Early Family Relationships and
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scientists in the United States have noted an advance in the onset of pu-
berty in girls.60 The early onset of puberty in girls is problematic for a
number of reasons. It is associated with an increased risk of breast can-
cer later in life, unhealthy weight gain, depression, anxiety, alcohol con-
sumption, sexual promiscuity, higher rates of teenage pregnancy, and
low birth weight of the resulting infants. 6'
Various hypotheses have been developed to explain this phenome-
non-ranging from hormones in milk and meat to obesity. It is likely
that there are multiple factors contributing to this troubling phenomenon,
but recent research suggests a surprising, new hypothesis. It appears
that, on average, girls raised with a stepfather (or presumably any unre-
lated adult male) present in the house enter puberty at an earlier age than
those with no male living in the household. 62 Those with involved bio-
logical fathers have, on average, the latest onset of puberty. 63 One plau-
sible, but still speculative, explanation for this phenomena relates to the
effects of human pheromones on the timing of puberty. While the pher-
omones of genetic fathers slightly delay the onset of puberty, those of
unrelated males significantly advance the onset of puberty. 64 If the pro-
posed explanation is confirmed, genetic fathers provide a benefit to their
daughters by just "being there."'65
B. SOCIETAL INTERESTS
There is a social interest in children's well-being. Insofar as one of
the objectives of a society is to "promote the common good," children's
well-being is, ipso facto, a societal interest. Furthermore, for a society to
flourish through time, its children must be raised with love, care and
sufficient material resources for them to flourish as individuals. The so-
cietal costs of children who are raised in abject poverty or without the
guidance of loving, involved parents are high.
Individual Differences in the Timing of Pubertal Maturation in Girls: A Longitudinal Test of
an Evolutionary Model, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 387, 387 (1999).
60 Ellis et al, supra note 59, at 387.
61 Id.
62 Ellis, supra note 59, at 164-65.
63 Id. at 166-67.
64 Id. Just 18% of girls from traditional homes began to menstruate by the time they
were 11 years old; 25% of girls in homes with no adult male present and 35% of girls in homes
with step-fathers present began to menstruate by this time. Id. Girls with stepfathers, on
average, menstruated nine months earlier than girls in "father-present" homes and girls in
homes with no unrelated male began menstruating four months earlier. See Ellis et al., supra
note 59, at 387; Ellis & Garber, supra note 59, at 485. The studies of Ellis and Garber con-
trolled for race since there are known racial differences in the average time of onset of puberty
in girls. Id. at 494.
65 Ellis, supra note 59, at 397.
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Children need adequate economic resources to thrive, and, as indi-
cated earlier, those who can draw on the economic resources of both
parents are less likely to be raised in poverty than those who must rely on
only one parent. Sufficient public assistance could, in theory, address the
problem of childhood poverty, but there are two primary problems with
relying on public assistance to solve this problem. First, because it does
not associate the costs with the behaviors that made those costs neces-
sary, it creates the wrong incentives and could encourage irresponsible
behavior. Second, in part because of the imprudent incentive structure,
such a system will inevitably become extremely costly by creating a per-
manent subculture dependent on public assistance.
Tying the costs of raising children to the activities that make these
costs necessary-which typically means making genetic parents respon-
sible for their children and thereby creating the right structure of incen-
tives-as a practical matter requires the establishment of genetic
paternity. 66 This requirement long has been and still is one of the pri-
mary social interests in paternity establishment.
As indicated above, the financial benefits that accrue to children are
not always direct benefits from the father. There are also third party
benefits of which some involve public funds, while others do not. Chil-
dren's access to the nonpublic funds also reduces their dependency on
public support.
There are a variety of other ways in which society can realize direct
financial benefits from paternity establishment. For example, if a rela-
tionship between a father and his child is created, it may save public
funds when the child takes some financial and personal responsibility for
the father's care in his old age. Establishing this relationship may also
make possible organ donations-either from father to child or vice versa.
This can reduce medical expenses and increase the availability of scarce
medical resources.
Clearly, one of the primary social benefits of paternity establish-
ment, at least if it results in fathers being involved in their children's
lives, is crucially linked to the developmental benefits father involvement
appears to produce. The absence of fathers from their children's lives
has been associated with a variety of behavioral problems that impose
significant social costs. While social science research seldom speaks un-
equivocally and conclusively, especially where significant policy issues
66 As I will suggest later (though I will not defend the proposition), it is not the genetic
relationship itself that is relevant to the existence of a moral duty to support a child, nor should
it be that relationship that is relevant to the existence of legal duty of support. See infra p. 56.
However, genetic paternity is practically always associated with the factor that does ground a
moral duty and should ground a legal duty. As such, it is evidentially related to an intrinsically
relevant factor.
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are at stake, there is overwhelming evidence that children who grow up
without their fathers are more likely to commit crimes, to engage in early
sexual relationships, to fail in school, and so forth.67
For example, one study found that 64% of adolescents charged with
murder grew up without a father involved in their lives. 68 Anne Hill and
June O'Neill found that young males are more likely to engage in crimi-
nal activity when raised without a father and even more likely to do so if
raised in a neighborhood with a high concentration of single-parent fami-
lies.69 Hill and O'Neill also found that the presence or absence of a
father in the home can explain nearly one-half of the racial differentials
in criminal behavior. 70 Additionally, a study of young men charged with
rape found that 60% grew up without their fathers.7 '
The increased risk of criminal behavior by individuals who grew up
without their fathers cannot be explained by the economic disadvantages
experienced by such children. 72 Research, however, seems to belie this
notion. Hill and O'Neill, for example, found that young black men
raised in single-parent families on welfare and living in public housing
are significantly more likely to be involved in criminal acts than young
black men raised in two-parent families who were also on welfare and
living in public housing.73 They concluded that "[t]he effects of family
income are surprisingly small and are seldom significant for predicting
dysfunctional behavior" 74 and that "[i]ncreases in parental income are
associated with only minimal reductions in dysfunctional behavior, while
a higher level of welfare benefits is generally associated with increases in
these behaviors. ' 75
It is in part because of the important social and interpersonal roles
that fathers play that Western cultures have associated paternal rights and
responsibilities with the role of being a father. Put simply, society's be-
liefs about paternal rights and responsibilities are grounded in facts about
paternity. Insofar as those factors in virtue of which one is a father "stay
67 M. ANNE HILL & JUNE O'NEILL, UNDERCLASS BEHAVIORS IN THE UNITED STATES:
MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS v-vii(1993); WARREN FARRELL, FATHER
AND CHILD REUNION: HOW TO BRING THE DADS WE NEED TO THE CHILDREN WE LOVE 29-54.
68 Nicholas Davidson, Life Without Father: America's Greatest Social Catastrophe, 51
POL'Y REV. 40, (1990)
69 See HILL & O'NEILL, supra note 67, at vi.
70 See id. at vii.
71 Nicholas Davidson, supra note 68, at 40.
72 Elaine Ciulla Kamarck, PUTTING CHILDREN FIRST: A PROGRESSIVE FAMILY POLICY FOR
THE 1990s (Progressive Policy Institute 1990).
73 See HILL & O'NEIL, supra note 68, at vii.
74 Id. at v.
75 Id. at vii.
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together" we can, for practical purposes, end the discussion there. The
bundle of normative elements 76 that we label paternal rights and respon-
sibilities attach to the Western concept of fatherhood. When we recog-
nize that paternity itself is not a unitary concept, but a bundle of roles,
relationships and features, it becomes apparent that we cannot be content
to say merely that paternal rights and responsibilities are grounded on
paternity. The "normative bundle" of rights and responsibilities is
grounded on the "descriptive bundle" of features, roles and relationships
that, taken together, constitute our ordinary conception of a father. Yet
this does not tell us which elements of the normative bundle are
grounded on which elements of the descriptive bundle.
II. PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW
Until recently, it was often not possible to have certainty about ge-
netic paternity. This mundane fact was expressed in folk wisdom as well
as esoteric legal principles. 77 Given the social structure common in
Western societies, however, the establishment of paternity served many
personal and social interests. Due to the importance of these interests,
Anglo-American legal systems have developed methods for establishing
paternity within the social characteristics and scientific capabilities of the
society.
By far, the predominant method of paternity establishment involved
the "marital presumption" (sometimes referred to as the "presumption of
legitimacy"). 78 This presumption, which has its roots in Roman law,
held that the husband of a mother was presumed to be the father of the
child, unless the husband was sterile, impotent, or had no access to his
wife during the period when conception occured.79 This presumption is
sometimes referred to as "Lord Mansfield's Rule;" strictly speaking,
76 Philosophers use 'normative' to refer to prescriptive or evaluative claims. Normative
claims are distinguished from descriptive claims and so claims about what behavior is statisti-
cally normal are not normative in the philosopher's sense-neither are claims about what
social roles are enforced in society. These are descriptive claims, possibly involving claims
about what norms people accept, but they are not, themselves, normative claims. See SHELLY
KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 1-11 (1998).
77 So, for example, we have the American proverbs, "maternity is a matter of fact, pater-
nity is a matter of opinion" and the better known, "mother's baby, father's maybe" as well as
the more learned, "mater semper certa est, pater nunquam" [the mother is always certain, the
father never is].
78 For a history of marital presumption's use in English common law courts, see Mary R.
Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, The Genetics Revolution: Conflicts, Challenges and Comm-
dra: DNA-Based Identity Testing and the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 AM.
J.L. & MED. 215, 221-26 (2002); David J. Shuster, Note, The Best Interests of the Child Must
Be Considered Before Rebutting the Presumption of Legitimacy, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 661,
667-70 (1994).
79 In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Blackstone says:
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however, that rule is a rule of evidence that prevents husbands and wives
from introducing testimony about their sexual relations for purposes of
undermining the marital presumption. Mansfield defended the rule
saying:
The law of England is clear, that the declarations of a
father or mother cannot be admitted to bastardize the is-
sue born after marriage .... As to the time of the birth,
the father and mother are the most proper witnesses to
prove it. But it is a rule, founded on decency, morality,
and policy, that they shall not be permitted to say after
marriage, that they had no connection, and therefore that
the offspring is spurious; more especially the mother,
who is the offending party.80
The marital presumption handled those cases in which the mother
was married. A different approach was used to handle paternity of chil-
dren of unmarried mothers. Two fundamental theories arose to ground a
man's responsibility to support a child that was born out of wedlock.
One was "the theory of delict," in which the responsibility was based on
the wrongful act of illicit intercourse with the mother. 81 The second the-
Pater est quem nuptice demonstrant. [The nuptials show who is the father.] The
marriage of the mother declares the paternity of the child. At common law, the nup-
tials must proceed the birth of the child; in the civil law, they may proceed or follow.
I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *446, *454-56.
80 Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257, 1258 (1777). Mansfield states his rule in a
question-begging way, of course, since what is at issue is whether the husband of the mother
is, indeed, the father. Id. But this is a trivial point, easily corrected. The more important part
of the justification for the martial presumption, as well as for Lord's Mansfield's rule, was that
the negative consequences of illegitimacy for the offspring were so profound. Illegitimate
children were sometimes referred as filii nullius (children of no one). See Stephen L. Sass,
The Defense of Multiple Access (Exceptio Plurium Concubentium), in Paternity Suits: A Com-
parative Analysis, 51 TUL. L. REV. 468, 469-80 (1977). At one time, such children had no
legal rights with respect even to their mothers. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 81, at *447.
Blackstone sums up succinctly the law in England during his time, saying, "The rights [of a
bastard] are very few, being only such as he can acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being
looked upon as the son of nobody, and sometimes called filius nullius, sometimes filius
populi." Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). Over the past few centuries, the legal
status of children born to unmarried parents has improved rather dramatically. See generally
PETER LASLETT, KARLA OOSTERVEEN & RICHARD SMITH, BASTARDY AND ITS COMPARATIVE
HISTORY (1980); Wolfgang P. Hirczy de Mino, From Bastardy to Equality: The Rights of
Nonmartial Children and their Fathers in Comparative Perspective, 31 J. COMP. FAM. STUD.
231 (2000). As the legal status of non-martial children improves, at least one of Lord Mans-
field's considerations of "decency, morality and policy" diminishes. Goodright, 98 Eng. Rep.
at 1258. Finally, it is interesting to note that Lord Mansfield finds it especially offensive for
the mother to challenge marital presumption. Id. Modem employment of the marital pre-
sumption has, probably, been aimed primarily at the father's attempt to challenge the
presumption.
81 Sass, supra note 80, at 469. Stephen Sass provides an excellent discussion of the
history of the "defense of multiple access" in paternity suits and how the two theories led to
different legal approaches.
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ory, "the theory of descent," grounded the obligation on the father's
blood relationship with the child.82 In cases where there was only one
potential father, where only one man could have engaged in the "illicit
sex" with the mother at the time conception must have taken place, the
two theories led to the same result.83 These two theories allow divergent
approaches, however, in cases where more than one man had sexual rela-
tions with the mother during the period when conception might have
taken place.84 According to the theory of delict, "each man who had
intercourse with the mother during the critical period could be held liable
in full for maintenance of the child since liability was based on an unlaw-
ful act committed by each."' 85 The theory of descent, on the other hand,
treated the situation of "multiple access" as a defense against a paternity
action since the man who was related to the child by blood could not be
determined. 86 Gradually, the theory of descent won out over the theory
of delict.
In the early and middle 18th century in England, a series of changes
to the Poor Laws addressed the problem of the poverty of children born
out of wedlock.87 These "Bastardy Laws" (as they were known):
" Required an unmarried pregnant woman to declare her
pregnancy and name the father;
" Required the putative father to provide financially for
his child, punishing non-compliance with jail; and,
* Provided for support for the mother and child from the
parish until the father agreed to support the child, at
which time he was required to reimburse the parish. 88
In 1844, amendments to the Poor Laws provided an unwed mother
with a civil right of claim against the alleged father, even if she was not
receiving public assistance. 89
The model developed in England for handling financial support of
children born out of wedlock was adopted by most common law legal
82 Id.
83 See id.
84 Id.
85 id. at 469.
86 Id.
87 See generally PAUL SLACK, THE ENGLISH POOR LAW, 1531-1782 (1995); SIDNEY
WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, English Poor Law History: The Last Hundred Years, in 7-8 EN-
GLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT 7-8 (1963).
88 Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their Parents Before the United States
Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional Jurispru-
dence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 8 n.30 (1999). This approach to dealing with the poverty of
children of unmarried parents is remarkably similar in concept to that employed today in West-
ern legal systems. Id. at 8 n.32.
89 Webb & Webb, supra note 87, at 8; ENGLISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT 178.
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systems. Moreover, it is similar to the system employed in much of
Western Europe. 90
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF PATERNITY ESTABLISHMENT/
DISESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICAN LAW
As is obvious from the brief recounting of the history of paternity
establishment, contemporary Western societies confront many of the
same problems faced in earlier centuries. In modern society, however,
the problem of paternity establishment for out-of-wedlock children is at a
dramatically elevated level.9' Fortunately, we face these old problems
with powerful new tools in hand. Yet even as they help us solve the old
problems, these tools create new ones. Until very recently, Anglo-Amer-
ican legal systems handled the problem of paternity establishment in a
manner very similar to that employed historically. The marital presump-
tion has been virtually universal in Anglo-American legal systems.92
Further, while the technology and legal procedures for establishing pater-
nity for children born to unmarried mothers has evolved markedly, both
the reasons for such establishment and the underlying principles of law
involved have remained constant.
There has been an increasing tension, however, between the im-
provement in the techniques for determining paternity of out-of-wedlock
children and the presumption of paternity of children of married women.
Indeed, the techniques for establishing paternity can serve to disestablish
biological paternity in cases where it was previously established by the
marital presumption, by acknowledgement or by previous court action.
DNA testing is on a collision course with this long-recognized legal pre-
sumption. Because paternity disestablishment is one of the important
trends that require a reevaluation of the concept of paternity, we will
return to this issue shortly. The need to re-examine the concept of pater-
nity does not arise from this issue. There are other issues-dramatically
illustrated by real, if bizarre, legal cases-that clearly demonstrate the
90 See generally A.G. Chloros, THE REFORM OF FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE (1978).
91 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2000, 50
NAT'L VITAL STATISTICS REP. 5 (2000), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr
50/nvsr50_05.pdf (last visited Sept. 9 2003). One-third of all births were to unwed mothers, a
figure that reflects an enormous rise from the 18.4% of births to unmarried mothers in 1980.
Id. The rate of non-martial births is not constant across racial and ethnic groups. In 2000, it
was approximately 22.1% of those identifying themselves as white, 42.7% for those identify-
ing themselves as "Hispanic," and 68.7% for those identifying themselves as "black." Id. The
rate across age groups is more nearly even. Id. Perhaps surprisingly, though, it is lower for
women under 20 years of age (29.3%); women 20 to 24 years old had the highest rate (36.4%)
and women of 25 years of age and over had a rate of nonmarital birth of 34.3%. Id.
92 See Joan C. Sylvan, Michael H. v. Gerald D.: The Presumption of Paternity, 39 CATH.
U. L. REV. 831, 831-32 (1990).
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need to clarify our conception of paternity. We will begin with some of
these.
A. PROBLEM CASES
1. Statutory Rape Cases
There are, unfortunately, numerous cases in which an adult woman
became pregnant as a result of sexual relations she initiated with a minor
child-sometimes a young teen or a preteen. 93 The act that caused preg-
nancy in these cases is statutory rape. The adult who engages in it is
criminally liable for the action; the minor child is considered a victim of
this action because he is deemed incapable of giving legally significant
consent to the act of sexual intercourse. 94 However, courts have not held
that these facts settle the question of whether both genetic parents have a
responsibility to financially support the resulting children. Indeed, courts
have held that these facts are not even relevant to that question. 95
Courts across the country have given an unequivocal answer to the
question of whether both genetic parents have an obligation to support a
child who is the product of an act of statutory rape. The obligation to
support a child is not altered by the fact that the parent was a victim of
statutory rape. 96 In a 1993 Kansas case, the court concluded that:
This State's interest in requiring minor parents to sup-
port their children overrides the State's competing inter-
est in protecting juveniles from improvident acts, even
when such acts may include criminal activity on the part
of the other parent.... This minor child, the only truly
innocent party, is entitled to support from both her par-
ents regardless of their ages. 97
93 See, e.g., Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); Schierenbeck v. Manor, 148 Colo. 582 (1961); Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Bennet v.
Miller, 688 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); In re J.S., 193 Ill. App. 3d 563, 550 (1990);
State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993); Rush v. Hatfield, 929
S.W.2d 200 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 442 N.E.2d 1155 (Mass.
1982); Jevning v. Chicos, 499 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Mercer County Dep't of
Soc. Serv. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S.2d 288 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992); In re Paternity of J.L.H. v. L.H.,
149 Wis. 2d 349 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
94 Rush, 929 S.W.2d at 202.
95 Id.; Seyer, 847 P.2d at 1278 ("We conclude that the issue of consent to sexual activity
under the criminal statutes is irrelevant in a civil action to determine paternity and for support
of the minor child of such activity.").
96 Seyer, 847 P.2d at 1279.
97 Id.
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2. Purloined Sperm Cases
The question of what, if anything, can count as stealing a man's
sperm is both interesting and controversial. The issue was brought to
public attention some years ago when Peter Wallis sued Kellie Smith for
breach of contract, fraud, and conversion of property after she became
pregnant from one of their acts of sexual intercourse. 98 Wallis argued
that Smith had breached a contract by not taking birth control pills when
she promised to do so, committed fraud by lying about taking birth con-
trol pills, and committed conversion by using his sperm for a purpose he
did not authorize. 99 Wallis's suit was dismissed "for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted" and the dismissal was upheld
on appeal. 100
Consider Wallis's claim of conversion of property, even though the
court did not rely on it in dismissing Wallis's suit. 101 Wallis claimed that
Smith had used his sperm in an unauthorized manner-a manner that
constituted conversion of property. 0 2 Smith contended that Wallis "sur-
rendered any right to possession to his semen when he transferred it dur-
ing voluntary intercourse."' 103 It is beyond the scope of the discussion
here to try to resolve questions about what counts as "authorized" use of
a man's sperm. Several points, however, are worth making in passing.
First, voluntarily transferring physical possession of a thing does not
generally constitute transferring property rights to the thing.°4 If it did,
parking valets would own far more (and probably better) cars than they
do. There are social practices that determine the social meaning, as well
as the moral and legal significance, of an act of physical transfer of prop-
erty. One cannot resolve the moral and legal questions of ownership by
merely documenting the history of voluntary physical transfers. Nor is
the case different with respect to bodily fluids, such as semen. Suppose a
couple is having fertility problems and the man goes to a lab for testing
of his sperm count and quality. He ejaculates in a specimen jar and
transfers the semen to a lab technician. Now, suppose the lab technician
impregnates herself with this man's semen. The technician's use is quite
98 Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
99 Id.
l00 Id. at 683.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 In her legal filings, Smith frames the thesis in terms of Wallis "surrendering any right
of possession to this semen." See Barbara Vobejda, Court to Decide if Man Has a Right to
Choose Fatherhood, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1998, at Al. At issue, however, is not the right of
possession, but the right to decide to put the semen to a specific use. To interpret Smith's
claims as relevant, we will assume that she meant not only that Wallis had surrendered any
right of possession but also any right of control. As a result, she alleges, he has no say in how
the semen was used.
104 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, CH. XIV, *10 (1688).
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clearly an unauthorized use of the semen. Given our social practices, this
is the case even in the absence of an explicit contract between the patient
and the lab that his semen will not be used to impregnate someone with-
out his knowledge or consent. Smith's argument must be that there is
something special about the nature of transferring semen in an act of
voluntary intercourse that constitutes surrendering any right to control
how it is used. It is difficult to see what would make sexual intercourse
special in this way.' 0 5 It is also difficult to determine what counts as
"sexual intercourse" and what counts as transferring semen during sex-
ual intercourse.10 6 For example, is oral sex sexual intercourse?' 0 7
Late in 1983, Emile Frisard and his siblings were frequently at the
East Jefferson General Hospital to help take care of their parents who
were patients there.' 0 8 Debra Rojas, working for the hospital as a nurs-
ing assistant became "abnormally friendly" (as one witness described it)
with the family-visiting Frisard's parents' room frequently "to the point
of being bothersome" (as another testified).' 0 9 Frisard was with his par-
ents practically every night and Rojas often visited when he was there.110
According to Frisard's unchallenged testimony, on one of these visits
Rojas offered to have oral sex with Frisard provided he used a con-
dom.'"I He agreed and, after he left, Rojas apparently inseminated her-
105 It is, though, easy to see why the courts would not want to be drawn into issues
concerning the appropriate assumptions between partners in acts of sexual intercourse. There
may be no common assumptions and, even when there are, evidential problems are obvious.
Such shared assumptions are seldom discussed between the partners explicitly and even less
frequently are they committed to writing.
106 Suppose Wallis used a condom and Smith had retrieved the discarded condom and
artificially impregnated herself with it. Would it count as semen "transferred during voluntary
sexual intercourse"? Suppose that Smith had, in anticipation of Wallis's using a condom,
surreptitiously removed the condom he kept in his wallet and punctured it with holes. Then,
were he to have voluntary sexual intercourse with her, it is seems literally true that Wallis
would have "transferred [his semen) during voluntary sexual intercourse." He would not,
however, have voluntarily transferred his semen. This latter seems to be the crucial point.
107 Former President Clinton famously asserted: "I did not have sexual relations with that
woman-Ms.Lewinski." See What Clinton Said, WASH. POST., Jan. 26, 1998, at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/whatclintonsaid.htm. He later ad-
mitted that Ms. Lewinsky had performed oral sex on him but, apparently, questioned whether
having oral sex was equivalent to having sexual relations. Oral Sex-Does it Constitute Sex-
ual Relations, BBCNEws ONLINE NETWORK, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/events/clinton-
under fire/multimedia/173278.stm (last visited on Sept. 26, 2003) (presenting videotape of
President Clinton's testimony before the grand jury explaining why he believed that oral sex
performed on him was not sexual relations). Few people accepted Clinton's distinction. How-
ever, the notion of sexual intercourse is narrower than that of sexual relations. It is much more
plausible to many people that oral sex, while being a sex act and a form of sexual relations, is
not an instance of sexual intercourse.
108 Louisiana v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
109 Id.
I o Id. at 1035.
111 Id.
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self with the sperm in the condom. 1 2 Frisard denied that he ever had
vaginal intercourse with Rojas and he apparently had no indication that
Rojas would use his sperm in this way. 1 3 Based on DNA testing, the
court determined that Frisard was the father and ordered him to pay child
support retroactively, resulting in an immediate arrearage of almost
$18,000.114 This decision was upheld on appeal, though the trial court's
specific determination of the amount of child support was remanded for
further consideration on grounds unrelated to the unusual genesis of the
pregnancy. "15
In the case of Emile Frisard, there was, at least, a voluntary sexual
act that played a causal role in Rojas' pregnancy (this paper will set aside
the issue of whether Frisard engaged in an act of sexual intercourse). 1 16
While it is difficult to see why the fact that one of the acts that played a
causal role in Rojas' pregnancy was a sexual act by Frisard should have
any bearing on his responsibility for the pregnancy, even the element of a
voluntarily sexual act is missing from the following case.
In September of 1992, an Alabama woman identified as T.M. appar-
ently had sexual relations with a man, identified as S.F., while the man
was unconscious." 7 T.M. became pregnant and bore a child, who was
later determined to be the genetic offspring of S.F. 1 8 A witness testified
that T.M. had told him that S.F.'s sexual act had "saved her a trip to the
sperm bank."1' 19 On the basis of S.F.'s genetic relationship with the
child, he was determined to be the father and ordered to pay child sup-
112 Frisard, 694 So. 2d at 1035.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1041.
116 Id. at 1035.
117 S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So.2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). This is not the
first such story. Genesis 19:30-38 recounts the story of Lot's two daughters rendering him
unconscious with alcohol and raping him while he was incapacitated.
Come, let us make our father drink wine, and we will lie with him, that we may
preserve seed of our father. And they made their father drink wine that night: and
the firstborn went in, and lay with her father; and he perceived not when she lay
down, nor when she arose. And it came to pass on the morrow, that the first born
said unto the younger, Behold, I lay yesternight with my father: let us make him
drink wine this night also; and go thou in, [and] lie with him, that we may preserve
seed of our father. And they made their father drink wine that night also: and the
younger arose, and lay with him; and he perceived not when she lay down, nor when
she arose. Thus were both the daughters of Lot with child by their father.
118 Id. at 1186.
119 Id. at 1188.
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port.120 This decision was upheld by the Civil Court of Appeals of
Alabama. 121
The pleadings made by Kellie Smith suggest that one of the crucial
issues in any of these purloined sperm cases is whether the genetic father
had any right to control how his sperm was used. 122 The courts, how-
ever, ignored this issue almost entirely-typically mentioning it only to
dismiss its relevance.' 23 With respect to a duty to support a child, the
court in Wallis noted that the New Mexico legislature adopted, with only
minor revisions, the recommendations of the Uniform Parentage Act that
"imposes a form of strict liability for child support without regard for
which parent bears the greater responsibility for the child's being."124
What the court in Wallis described as "a form of strict liability" has been
accepted by courts in the cases discussed above because "the child is an
innocent party, and it is the child's interests and welfare that we look to
under the Alabama Uniform Parentage Act. The purpose of this act is to
provide for the general welfare of the child .... ",125 The courts dis-
missed concerns about the unusual, and even wrongful, nature of the
genesis of the fetus as irrelevant to the "father's duty to provide support
for the child."126 Further, in all of these cases, the identity of the father
was settled entirely through genetic testing.
These cases suggest a settled approach to the establishment of
nonmarital paternity in the contemporary American legal system. In
these cases, genetic relationships establish legal paternity regardless of
whether the genetic fathers gave legal consent, or were capable of giving
legal consent, to an act of sexual intercourse that resulted in the
pregnancies. Indeed, Frisard treats the issue of whether there was an act
of sexual intercourse as irrelevant, and S.F. seems to consider the issue
of whether the man deemed the father took part in any action that caused
the pregnancy irrelevant. 127 The perspective behind the foundation of
these decisions is that being the genetic father is a sufficient condition for
grounding a paternal legal obligation to support a child. The principled
120 See id. at 1186-90. This decision contrasts markedly with the decision in The Divi-
sion of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Esther M. v. Mary L., No. 38812, 1994 Del. Fam.
Ct. LEXIS II (Del. Fam. Ct. 1994). In that case, the mother was relieved of any child support
responsibility because the pregnancy resulted from an act or rape. Id. at *2. The Alabama
court decision in S.F. did not reference the Delaware decision in Mary L.
121 S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1190.
122 See Wallis v. Smith, 22 P.3d 682, 683 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
123 S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189 (citing L. Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713 (N.Y.
1983), a case similar to Wallis, as grounds for dismissing as irrelevant issues other than biolog-
ical paternity).
124 Wallis, 22 P.3d at 684.
125 S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1189.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1189; Louisiana v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032, 1032 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
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basis for a duty to support that appears to underlie these decisions is the
theory of descent: a person has a moral obligation and should have a
legal obligation, to support those children who are his or her immediate
genetic descendants, regardless of other factors. The theory of delict
would lead to a contrary decision in these cases-most clearly, in S.F.
Indeed, issues relevant to the theory of delict are expressly swept
aside by these courts and others facing related questions:
" "[A]ny wrongful conduct on the part of the mother
should not alter the father's duty to provide support for
the child." 128
• "The mother's alleged fault or wrongful conduct is
irrelevant." 129
• "This Court is not concerned with the child's mother's
actions .... ",130
The courts have generally placed a duty on the genetic father to
support his child regardless of the illicit conduct of the mother in con-
ceiving the child. While illicit conduct on the part of the mother, per se,
does not seem relevant to the genetic father's duty, this should not be
construed to mean that the particular illicit actions of the mother might
not undermine the argument for a paternal responsibility. To say this is
not to challenge the existence of a child's right to be supported, but the
relevance of that alleged right to the decision these courts reach. That a
child has a positive right to support does not answer the question of
whom this right is a right against-the question of who has the obliga-
tion to provide for that child. The existence of a positive right to educa-
tion, for instance, does not establish any particular person has the
obligation to provide this education; this obligation could fall on all of
society collectively. A further argument is necessary to determine who
has the obligation to provide a person with something to which she has a
positive right. While it is quite plausible that a child's right to be sup-
ported imposes a special obligation on certain individuals, it is not clear
that this obligation should be imposed on the genetic father simply by the
virtue of being the genetic father. The question to ask is, "In virtue of
what actions, relationships or properties does a man have a special moral
obligation to provide financially for a child?"
The courts have implicitly relied solely on a theory of descent13'
probably less out of an ideological commitment to this theory than out of
128 S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1186
129 State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (Kan. 1993).
130 Mercer County Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Alf M., 589 N.Y.S. 2d 288 (Fain. Ct. N.Y.
1992).
131 There is at least one "outlier case" that does not fit well with this interpretation. In
Division of Child Support Enforcement ex rel. Esther M. v. Mary L., the court ruled that a
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convenience and the certainty that genetic testing provides concerning
questions of genetic paternity. A clear answer is frequently preferred to
a correct one and courts, no less than social scientists, are often guilty of
"looking where the light is better." 132  Nevertheless, this answer is
clearly wrong. If the actual cases cited above are .not clear enough evi-
dence of the inadequacy of the theory of descent as a foundation for an
obligation to support a child, consider the following hypothetical cases,
the first of which was described above:
• A man who is being tested for the count and quality of
his sperm gives a sperm sample to a lab technician.
She impregnates herself with the sperm and then seeks
(or the state seeks on her child's behalf) child support
from the genetic father.
• A woman undergoes a procedure for the removal of
her ovaries. The doctor, who is infertile, removes
some of the ripe eggs, fertilizes them in vitro with her
own husband's sperm and implants them in herself.
After she gives birth, she seeks child support from her
former patient.
• A couple preserves frozen embryos for the future pos-
sibility of bearing children. A worker at the cryogenic
lab implants one of the embryos in her uterus and car-
ries the embryo to term. Then, she seeks child support
from the couple.
• An emergency room surgeon is treating a wealthy man
who has been injured in a car accident. Unfortunately,
the patient dies. After his death, the surgeon harvests
sperm from his body and impregnates herself with it.
After the child is born, she seeks child support from
the estate of the deceased man.
To argue in any of these cases that genetic relation alone determines
the basis for a parental obligation to support a child is preposterous.
woman indisputably the genetic mother of the child should be exempted from a support obliga-
tion if she could show that she did not, in fact, consent to the sexual intercourse. No. 38812,
1994 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 11, *9-10. To distinguish this case from those of statutory rape of
a minor child, the court distinguished legal consent from "actual consent" and emphasized that
the relevant concept was the latter. Id. "Where voluntary intercourse results in parenthood,
then for purposes of child support, the parenthood is voluntary. A parent's duty to support the
child flows directly from his voluntary parenthood." Id. This is clearly a divergence from the
theory of descent and from the stated rationales of the cases discussed in the text. (It is interest-
ing to note the court's seemingly unwitting slide from "voluntary intercourse that leads to
parenthood" to "voluntary parenthood."). Id.
132 The phrase comes from the old comedy sketch of a person looking for a misplaced
item, not where it was lost, but under a street lamp "because the light is better" there.
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However, the reasoning of the courts in the above-cited cases would lead
precisely to this result. For, as these courts say:
[T]he child is an innocent party, and it is the child's in-
terests and welfare that we look to .... Our goal is "to
provide for the general welfare of the child[.] ' 133
[A]ny wrongful conduct on the part of [someone else]
should not alter the [parent's] duty to provide support for
the child.' 34
Few would find such a line of reasoning plausible in these hypothet-
ical cases. This fact shows that the line of reasoning is not right even
where it arrives at answers that some find more palatable. Even when
the strict theory of descent gets the right answer, it gets it for the wrong
reasons.
While the cases discussed above all seem to imply that courts have
taken genetic parenthood to be sufficient to ground a child support obli-
gation, other cases (which are rather common, unfortunately) suggest
that the current legal climate does not view genetic fatherhood as a nec-
essary condition for the establishment of legal paternity and a duty to
support a child. There are other routes to the determination of paternity
and the grounding of a duty to support a child. In the first place, the
marital presumption is still generally adopted by Anglo-American courts.
Furthermore, even in the absence of a legal marriage, playing the role of
a father and representing oneself as the father of a child can also be used
as a basis for a determination of legal paternity. So desirous is the legal
system of ensuring "paternity identification" that it has recognized multi-
ple independent grounds for legal paternity and a duty to support a child.
The situation in which there are several independent grounds suffi-
cient to establish legal paternity indicates the social urgency that attends
to the determination of legal paternity. It also sets up potential conflicts.
What happens when genetic testing and other methods for establishing
paternity identify different men as the father? One answer-an answer
that would seem natural when there are independent sufficient grounds
for the application of a concept-would be to allow for multiple pater-
nity. Indeed, if one is considered to be a child's father by virtue of being
the biological father, by virtue of the social role that one voluntarily and
publicly accepts and by virtue of being married to the mother of the
child, then the most obvious conclusion would be that a child can have
multiple fathers if these three properties are instantiated by different
men. This conclusion has been explicitly rejected by the courts. The
Supreme Court summarized the rejection in Michael H. v Gerald D.,
133 S.F., 695 So. 2dat 1189.
134 Id. at 1186.
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declaring that "California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for
dual fatherhood." 35
Ruling out the possibility of multiple fatherhood, the Court had to
determine the factors for legal paternity when the various grounds which
could be sufficient pointed to different men. 136 The trial court in
Michael H. answered this question in a dramatic fashion in granting sum-
mary judgment. 137 The Supreme Court affirmed, allowing the marital
presumption to override a genetic relationship and, moreover, to override
the fact that the genetic father played the role of a social father, repre-
sented himself, was represented by the mother as the father of the child,
and kept a household with the mother for the benefit of the child. 13 8
Here, the marital presumption trumped genetic considerations and practi-
cally every other property or relationship that has been held to ground
legal paternity.
Until very recently, the major changes in paternity law concerned
paternity establishment concentrated on ways to establish paternity more
effectively and cheaply. Even the improvements in accuracy were hailed
primarily for their ability to establish paternity more effectively. Very
recently, there has been remarkably rapid change concerning the legal
disestablishment of paternity, and this change is undermining the power
of the marital presumption.
Since 1994, at least seven states have enacted laws concerning the
disestablishment of paternity based on DNA tests.' 39 At least seven
others have pending legislation. 140 Numerous other states have control-
ling court decisions either allowing or mandating such disestablishment
under a variety of circumstances when DNA tests show that the child is
135 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989).
136 Id. at 115.
137 Id. at 127.
138 Id. One wonders whether the marital presumption would have carried as much weight
in with the courts had the husband, Gerald D. died leaving the mother, Carol D. and her
daughter, Victoria, destitute. Had she applied for public assistance, one might doubt that the
state of California would have given as much weight to the marital presumption in its decision
about whether to pursue Michael M. for child support payments to reimburse the state for the
public assistance it gave Carol and Victoria. The reasoning of the courts discussed above,
which base determinations of paternity for child support purposes solely on the genetic rela-
tionship, suggests that, had the state chosen to impose a child support obligation on Michael
M., the courts would have endorsed this. Id. at 127.
139 They are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 26-17A-1 (1994), Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-
812 (2001), Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-54 (2002), Maryland, MA. CODE ANN. §5-1038
(1994), Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3119.962 (2000), Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.10
(2001), and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.335 (2002).
140 These states are: California, S.B. 1030 (Ca. 2003), Idaho, H.B. 417, (Id. 2004-5),
Michigan, H.B. 4120; H.B. 4650; S.B. 621 (Mich. 2003), New Jersey, A. 2374; S. 2692 (N.J.
2003), New York, A. 6269 (N.Y. 2003), Texas, H.B. 503 (Tx. 2003), and Vermont, H. 330
(Vt. 2004).
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not the genetic child of the man designated as the legal father.' 4' These
developments constitute legal reform at a breakneck speed.
In those states that have recently passed new legislation to allow
DNA evidence to overturn a paternity determination established by a
marital presumption or an acknowledgment that is based on fraud, the
legislation "sailed through" the legislatures. 142 The speedy passage of
this legislation indicates the speed with which scientific methods can
overtake a centuries-old legal principle like marital presumption.
1 43
Much of the preceding discussion has concerned the obligation to
provide financial support for a child. While that obligation is typically
considered a paternal responsibility, and more generally, a parental one,
it might seem to digress from the central topic of this paper. Indeed, in
the problematic cases discussed, there is really no question of who the
father is. The victims of statutory rape, Emile Frisard, and S.F. are un-
questionably the fathers of the children in these cases. 144 The only ques-
tion is whether these fathers should have the obligation other fathers do
to financially support their child. 145
These cases are, though, misleading in their clarity. The genetic
relationship seems to settle the question of paternity in each of these
cases because, coincidentally, there is no rival for the designation of
"dad." Consider this hypothetical, though: imagine that chemotherapy
renders a young man sterile. He undergoes a transplant of testicular tis-
sue, receiving healthy tissue from his brother. The transplanted tissue
begins producing healthy sperm cells in the recipient. 146 Thereafter, the
141 I am indebted to Carnell Smith, Executive Director & Founder, U.S. Citizens against
Paternity Fraud (US-CAPF), for providing me with this information that is up-to-date as of this
writing.
142 For example, in Ohio, there was only one dissenting vote in both of the houses com-
bined. H.B. 242, 123d Ohio Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2000), available at http://www.
lsc.state.oh.us/analyses/00-hb242.pdf. In Georgia, there were only six dissenting votes in both
of the houses. H.B. 369, 2002 Ga. Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2002), available at http://
www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2001_02/hb369.htm.
143 See In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472-73 (1930) (Cardozo, C.J.) ("Potent, indeed, the
presumption [of legitimacy] is one of the strongest and most persuasive known to law, and yet
subject to the sway of reason. Time was, the books tell us, when its rank was even higher.").
We are currently watching the rank of the marital presumption plummet. See text accompany-
ing note 47, supra p. 41. This is largely because DNA testing has given us indisputable facts
that undermine the result of the presumption in a surprisingly large number of cases. As
Cardozo went on to say, "[w]hen all the ends the presumption of legitimacy is designed to
conserve have been defeated by sordid facts, the courts must deal with the situation in a com-
mon sense way." See Findlay, 253 N.E. at 474-75 (quoting Nolting v. Holt, 215 P.281, 281
(Kan. 1923)). DNA testing does not itself give us the "sordid facts," but it can show us that
the facts must exist.
144 See S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1186; Frisard, 694 So. 2d at 1032. In both of these cases, the
men were established as the biological fathers.
145 I am grateful to David Merli for pressing me to clarify this point.
146 To my knowledge there have been no successful transplants of this sort between two
humans. There have been successful surgeries in which a healthy testicular tissue is removed
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donor dies in an accident shortly after the transplant. The recipient of the
transplant eventually marries. He and his wife have a normal sexual re-
lationship and after a few years, they decide to have a baby. They stop
using birth control and the man impregnates his wife. The child is con-
ceived in the normal way as a result of the couple's intentions to have a
child. The man lives with the woman and helps to support her through
the pregnancy. He goes to Lamaze classes with her and, when she is
ready to deliver the child, the obstetrician allows him to "catch" the baby
and cut the umbilical cord. The man rears the baby, nurtures him, and
provides for him throughout his childhood. Here, the transplant recipient
is the father in every respect except one-he is not the genetic father. In
this hypothetical, to claim that the genetic relationship settles the identity
of the father is simply to dig in one's heels and insist that genetics are all
one cares about.
The obligation to financially support a child is one of the elements
in the "normative bundle" of paternity-the bundle of rights and respon-
sibilities typically associated with this concept. The cases just discussed
suggest that it has been grounded on the wrong element of the "descrip-
tive bundle" of paternity. It has been based solely on genetic paternity
when, in fact, it is properly grounded on other elements of paternity. To
develop this line of thought, more has to be said about the concept of
paternity.
IV. THE CONCEPT OF PATERNITY
Most people can easily answer the question of who their father is.
This is not because the question is unequivocal. This question is ambig-
uous-though perhaps the ordinary notion of ambiguity is not quite the
right one here. Those who can answer the question easily can do so
because the various elements of paternity are co-referential in their case;
regardless of which element is salient, the very same man is picked out
by the term "father."
The stereotypical concept of a father is a compound concept, having
multiple elements that are typically co-instantiated in the same individ-
ual, or at least are so co-instantiated frequently enough for the stereotype
to be socially useful. 147 When these elements are co-instantiated, the
concept works well enough for most practical purposes; regardless of
from a man prior to chemotherapy that destroys his ability to produce sperm. The removed
tissue is then reintroduced into the man's testicles and begins to function to produce healthy
sperm. See Martin Hutchinson, Testicle Transplant Makes Sperm, BBC NEWS ONLINE, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3032804.stm (last visited Sept. 8, 2003). Surgeries of this
sort have resulted in functioning testicles and in allowing men to father children after the
surgery. Id.
147 How frequently probably depends on many factors, including the social role that such
a stereotype might play.
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which elements one uses to identify the referent of the term, one is led to
the same man. Many of the cases discussed in the previous section illus-
trate that these elements are not necessarily co-instantiated. When they
are not, the different elements that form our compound concept of a fa-
ther may point to different men. In those cases, practical difficulties may
ensue.
In certain contexts, the meaning of "father" is clearly restricted. For
example, if a doctor asks an angina patient whether his father had a his-
tory of heart disease, it is relatively clear that he means his genetic fa-
ther.' 48 Almost as clearly, if a girl tells a friend that her father will drive
them to the movies, social roles fix the intended reference.
This discussion of the current legal understanding of "father" shows
that the context does not always sufficiently resolve the meaning of a
term. Saying "for legal purposes" is little help because there are multiple
legal purposes for establishing paternity and they lead in diverse direc-
tions. Is society concerned with establishing an obligation of financial
child support? With acting on a child's right to access to her genetic
heritage? With ensuring a child an ongoing relationship with a person
who has reared and supported him? With determining who has a right to
speak for the child if she cannot speak for herself? Each of these con-
cerns could, under certain circumstances, lead us in a different direction
in determining paternity.
Failure to recognize this explicitly and adjust the conceptual frame-
work accordingly leads to seemingly endless arguments over who the
real father is. But as some redouble their efforts to defend a univocal
answer to the question of paternity, they forget that the objective is to
determine the properties, roles and relationships of fatherhood that give
rise to the moral and legal rights and responsibilities. 149 To achieve this
end, we do not have to work with a unequivocal concept of father-a
concept now clearly showing itself to be rather problematic.
The elements constituting the concept of paternity are typically, but
not necessarily, connected. The traditional concept of a father includes
genetic, psychological, and social elements, as well as elements of causal
and moral responsibility. It is generally understood that the psychologi-
cal and social aspects of fatherhood can exist separately from the genetic
aspect. There is a long history of adoptive fathers, stepfathers, and other
adult men nurturing, supporting, and raising children to whom they are
148 This clarity results from a background assumption that there are important genetic
predispositions to heart disease. Were we convinced that environment and, in particular, diet
and stressful living conditions, caused heart disease, we would more plausibly interpret the
doctor's question to be about someone fulfilling the social role of father. See Marjorie E.
Marenberg et al., Genetic Susceptibility to Death from Coronary Heart Disease in a Study of
Twins, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1041, 1041 (1994).
149 See Mahowald, supra note 4. Mahowald offers an unhelpful framing of these issues.
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not genetically related, sometimes even without knowing that there is no
genetic relationship. The separability of the genetic elements of pater-
nity from the elements of causal and moral responsibility for the devel-
opment of a child has not been acknowledged in legal literature. As a
result, its significance has not been appreciated.
Genetically, the father is the male parent, the man whose haploid
cell contributed half of his genetic material to the child.' 50 There was a
time when it would have seemed equally correct to say the genetic father
is the man who contributed the sperm cell to fertilize the egg that devel-
oped into a human infant. However, the possibility of fertilization
through the use of DNA of a haploidized normal (somatic) cell makes
this account problematic.' 5' The artificial gamete produced may not be
appropriately considered a sperm cell or, if it is considered a sperm cell,
it may be more properly considered that of another man.152
The role of the genetic father is typically closely associated with the
role of causing the pregnancy that result in the creation of a child. In a
normal case of impregnation, the same act that causes the process that
results in the development of a child involves the transfer of gametes
from the male parent to the female parent.' 53 One of these gametes, by
fusing with the egg, produces the genetic relation between the child and
the man who causes the development of new life.' 54 This connection is
not necessary, though, and techniques of artificial insemination and in
vitro fertilization can result in a genetic father who does not have causal
150 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, MAPPING OUR GENES: GEN-
OME PROJECTS: How BIG How FAST 24 (1988). Each human has forty-six paired chromo-
somes, half of them (a haploid set) from the father, and half from the mother. Id.
151 See Jason A. Barritt et al., Epigenic and Experimental Modifications in Early Mamma-
lian Development: Part II, 4 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 428, 434 (2001) ("The haploidization and
formation of artificial gametes by fusion of oocytes and non-germline cells will create gametes
with potential use in reproduction. However, these artificial gametes will have a nuclear ge-
netic component from a somatic cell and a mitochondrial component from another person's
germline cell.").
152 See generally LEE M. SILVER, REMAKING EDEN: CLONING AND BEYOND IN A BRAVE
NEW WORLD 160-87 (1997). This emerging technology promises much, including new con-
ceptual, ethical and legal problems. Silver characterizes the possibilities of two same sex
parents having a child with genetic material from the parents through a process that fuses cells
from two eight-cell embryos fertilized by the parents earlier. Id. at 185. The process creates a
human with two sets of chromosomes, one from each parent. Id. The resulting human could
effectively have three parents, two of the same sex, and a third would would contribute the
genetic opposite sex material. Id. These new technologies guarantees that paternity laws will
have to be rewritten and our popular categories of thought will have to evolve to handle the
new cases.
153 In re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990) ("A sperm is
merely a gamete, potentially capable, if successfully joined with an egg [also a gamete], of
creating an embryo which must then survive gestation to birth ..
154 Id.
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responsibility for the pregnancy or, alternatively, a man having causal
responsibility for a pregnancy without being the genetic father.' 55
Real life presents dramatic illustrations of genetic paternity without
what we might call "causal paternity." Numerous women have been im-
pregnated with the sperm of their dead husbands. 156 In some cases, the
sperm was harvested with the knowledge and assistance of the man, prior
to his death, who desired to make it possible for his wife to bear his
child. 157 Here, one might argue that the genetic father had the same
causal responsibility as in more ordinary cases of pregnancy even though
the causal mechanisms were extraordinary. In other cases, however, the
harvesting of the sperm occurs when the man is comatose or even after
the man's death, in situations in which the man had no antecedent
thoughts about the matter.158 The post-mortem harvesting of the sperm,
unanticipated by the genetic father, banishes the idea that the man exer-
cised any agency in the production of the new life. While his existence
played a causal role in the pregnancy, he did not act as a causal agent of
the pregnancy. 159 Nonetheless, he is the genetic father.
While one may sympathize with women who want to have a child
fathered by their deceased husbands, not all of the cases of genetic fa-
therhood without causal responsibility for a new life are so benign.
T.M., who raped S.F. while he lay unconscious and, thereby, "saved
her[self] a trip to the sperm bank," is not an object of our sympathy. 160
This case does, however, provide another clear case in which the genetic
father is not the causal father.
Due to the close causal link in the normal case between the act of
intercourse causing pregnancy and the genetic relation between the child
and the man involved in the act of sexual intercourse, few previous writ-
155 See generally Sherylynn Fiandaca, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryos: The
Need for International Guidelines, 8 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 337 (1998), for an introduction
into the legal problems underlying in vitro fertilization.
156 See generally S.E. Kahan, A.D. Seftel & M.I. Resnick, Postmortem Sperm Procure-
ment: A Legal Perspective, 161 J. UROL. 1840 (1999); S.M. Kerr et al., Postmortem Sperm
Procurement, 157 J. UROL. 2154 (1997); Gladys B. White, Legal and EthicalAspects of Sperm
Retrieval, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 359 (1999).
157 See L.A. Dwyer, Dead Daddies: Issues in Postmortem Reproduction, 52 RtrroERs L.
REV. 881 (2000); Carson Strong et al., Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm Retrieval After
Death or Persistent Vegetative State, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 347 (1999).
158 E.g., Dwyer, supra note 156, at 881 (citing Scott Sonner, Sperm Retrieval Raises
Questions, THE COLUMBIAN (Columbia, Wash., Oct. 2, 1998, at A2).
159 It is important to recognize that even the notion of genetic paternity involves a causal
element. One is not the genetic father of a child simply by virtue of a similarity in their
genetic make up. The relation of genetic descendent requires that the genetic material of the
father play a causal role-and a causal role of the right sort-in the genetic make up of the
child. The element of paternity that I am calling "causal paternity" requires agent causation; it
requires that the father be an agent in the act of impregnation.
160 S.F v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
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ers on paternity have separated genetic paternity from causal paternity. 161
Terms like "biological father," "natural father," or "genetic father" are
used to refer to both roles combined. I think of genetic and causal pater-
nity as facets of biological (or natural) paternity and this is how I will use
the terminology. Regardless of the typology, the genetic and causal ele-
ments of paternity are conceptually, and sometimes empirically, separate.
Keeping them separate is crucial to solving some of the legal conun-
drums concerning paternity.
The stereotypical concept of paternity includes much more than bio-
logical (either genetic or causal) elements. Typically, fathers and
mothers share moral responsibility for the existence of their children-
they voluntarily engage in actions that they know, or should know, might
cause pregnancy. This role is clearly separate from the genetic element
of paternity and it involves more than the mere causal paternity. One
may be a causal agent in the production of an outcome without being
morally responsible for it. This can happen because of various sorts of
"excusing conditions," of either a global or a local nature. Nonculpable
ignorance of certain relevant facts, compulsion and a multitude of other
factors may function as excuses from moral responsibility for an out-
come that one clearly caused. 162 With respect to responsibility for caus-
ing a new life, matters are no different. One can be causally responsible
for creating a child in the sense of having intentionally engaged in an
action that produces the child, without bearing any moral responsibility
for the new life.
Perhaps the most obvious case of a man being causally responsible
for a pregnancy without being morally responsible for it is the rare case
of heterosexual rape of a man that results in pregnancy. 163 For present
purposes, the definition of rape simply requires nonconsensual sexual
intercourse. 164 The absence of consent can result from a variety of fac-
tors. A typical rape is one by force or by coercion. In the first case,
161 An important exception is Peter Vallentyne, Equality and the Duties of Procreators, in
THE MORAL AND POLITICAL STATUS OF CHILDREN 195, 198 (David Archer & Collin McCleod
eds. 2002) (distinguishing between the concepts of procreator and biological parent).
162 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 205-19 (2001). See gener-
ally MICHAEL CORRADO, JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION
OF ESSAYS (1994).
163 See S.F., 695 So. 2d at 1186. The story of T.M. and S.F. is one of rape, but it is one in
which the man in question did not even have causal responsibility, because he did not take any
action that caused the pregnancy. Id. Different sorts of cases of heterosexual rape resulting in
pregnancy may divide causal and moral responsibility.
164 Not all jurisdictions define rape in this way and not all commentators agree on this
definition. See SUE BESSMER, THE LAWS OF RAPE 58-64 (Annette K. Baxter ed., 1984)
(1976); see also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29-41 (1987); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape:
An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1793-1805 (1992).
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sexual intercourse is achieved by simple brute force.' 65 The victim does
not yield to a threat, she or he is simply physically forced into inter-
course. 166 Rape by coercion involves the wrongful use of a threat to
secure compliance with a demand for intercourse. 167 But the absence of
consent need not result from force or coercion; it may also result from
some form of ignorance or incapacity. 168 Furthermore, rape may also
result from fraud where the action to which the victim consents is materi-
ally different from the act of sexual intercourse that takes place. 169
The heterosexual rape of a man by the employment of coercive
threats would be one example where a man would have causal but not
moral responsibility for the resulting child. Such cases are rare, and it is
rarer still that such an act leads to a successful pregnancy. Acts of this
sort, however, are certainly possible. 170 A man who is the victim of such
coercion would be causally responsible for the production of the child
who results from the coerced act of sexual intercourse. However, the
coercion would preclude his moral responsibility. This sort of case is
clear, albeit unusual. There are more common cases in which it is at
least plausible to deny moral responsibility for the creation of a new life
while conceding causal responsibility.
First, consider statutory rape. 17 1 An adult who has sexual inter-
course with a minor is guilty of statutory rape even if the minor was a
willing participant. 172 In recent decades, there have been numerous
cases of adult women having sexual relationships with young teenage
and even preteen boys. 173 On the theory behind statutory rape laws,
these underage boys are not yet capable of giving meaningful consent to
the woman's sexual advances. 174 We can make the moral situation
165 Patricia J. Falk, Rape By Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44
ARZ. L. REv. 131, 133 (2002).
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See generally Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L.
REV. 39 (1998).
170 The coercion need not be imposed by the woman with whom the victim has inter-
course. A third party could coerce the man into having sex with a willing or unwilling female
partner. State v. Haines, 25 So. 372, 373-74 (La. 1899) (holding that were one man to force
another man to have sex with the first man's wife, the first man "might well be found guilty of
the crime [of rape], and his unwilling instrument of its accomplishment acquitted").
171 See supra note 93 for cases of statutory rape of a boy leading to pregnancy of the
perpetrator.
172 See generally Britton Guerrina, Mitigating Punishnent for Statutory Rape, 65 U. CI.
L. REV. 1251 (1998).
173 The most famous case in recent years is that of Mary Kay Letourneau, the thirty-four
year old school teacher who had two children by a boy she began having sexual relations with
when he was thirteen. See GREGG OLSEN, IF LOVING YOU IS WRONG (1999); see also State v.
Letoumeau, 997 P.2d 436 (Wash. App. Div. 1st 2000).
174 See Guerrina, supra note 172, at 1257-58.
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clearer by imagining that the boy does not fully understand the connec-
tion between sexual intercourse and pregnancy; given his age, one cannot
reasonably expect him to understand this connection. Perhaps the wo-
man, usually a teacher or some other authority figure, has intentionally
misled the boy about the possible consequences of sexual intercourse.
These cases, which are not merely hypothetical, illustrate situations in
which a male has causal responsibility, but not moral responsibility, for
the existence of the child that results from the sexual activity.
We could also imagine the case of a mentally retarded father who
has sexual intercourse at the urging of a mentally competent woman who
has the intention of getting pregnant by him. If his retardation makes the
father incapable of understanding the connection between sexual inter-
course and pregnancy but is not severe enough to call into question his
agency, he may be causally responsible but not morally responsible for
the pregnancy.
Another, perhaps more controversial, example of a man having
causal responsibility but not moral responsibility, for a new life is
presented in the case of Emile Frisard.' 75 Frisard engaged in an action
that was a causal contributor to Rojas' pregnancy. In this sense, Frisard
acted in a way that was causally related to the pregnancy. Most people
would be reluctant to hold him morally responsible for the production of
a new life because his course of conduct was not one that any reasonable
person would anticipate had any chance of resulting in pregnancy. If that
is correct, then this case is also one in which a man who is causally
responsible for a new life is not morally responsible for that life.
These cases show the need to distinguish causal responsibility for a
child's life from moral responsibility for that life. Once this distinction
is made, we need to recognize that fathers are typically both causally and
morally responsible for the lives of their children. Our paradigmatic fa-
ther is the genetic father who is both causally and morally responsible for
the creation of his children. Much more is involved in our stereotypical
conception of a father, as well.
Other elements of fatherhood include a variety of psychological re-
lationships to a child and social roles with respect to the child. Ordina-
rily, fathers and children are bound together by special bonds of
affection. This does not entail that "father-child love" can exist only
between individuals who have other elements of the father-child relation-
ship (genetic, causal, etc.). Indeed, the point of this current exercise is to
understand that the various elements of paternity are conceptually sepa-
rable and sometimes separate in fact. Therefore, a man who either know-
ingly or unknowingly bears no genetic relationship to a child, may love
175 Louisana v. Frisard, 694 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
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that child (and the child may love him) in the way that is characteristic of
fathers and children. When such bonds result from the false belief that
there is a genetic relationship, they are frequently destroyed when the
truth comes out and often not because either the child or the putative
father chooses to end the relationship. 176
In addition, the emotional ties fathers have toward their children
usually lead to voluntary financial support of their children. Fathers
mentor their children, nurture them, discipline them, cuddle them, protect
them, encourage them, and much more. It is clear enough that these
elements can come apart from each other in various ways and that they
can come apart from other aspects of paternity.
This section has attempted to understand the concept of paternity by
looking at its various elements. These elements are conceptually distinct
and may be-and, due to technological and social changes, increasingly
are-instantiated in different men. Increasingly, some of them are not
instantiated at all. As important as it is to separate these different aspects
of fatherhood conceptually, it is also important to understand the various
connections between them. The elements of fatherhood are not com-
bined in our concept of a father merely accidentally, as an optional mat-
ter of social convenience, or even as a social construct that exists without
a biological foundation.
In ordinary cases of pregnancy, there is a close causal connection
between causal paternity and genetic paternity. Also, in most cases, the
causal father meets the conditions for moral responsibility. Exceptions
are not just statistically rare; they are generally deviations from our so-
cial norms concerning sexual relations.
Furthermore, important causal connections exist between the bio-
logical elements of paternity and the social and psychological elements.
Presumably, the reason paternal investment evolved is that it enhanced a
man's inclusive fitness. As was mentioned before, this does not entail
that the mechanisms that trigger the panoply of paternal behaviors de-
pend directly on the existence of a genetic relationship between a man
and his child, and certainly not on knowledge of this genetic relation-
ship. 177 Indeed, the proximate causes of fatherly behavior could, in prin-
ciple, be factors that are not even causally dependent on a genetic
relationship. Thus, if over the evolutionary period of humans, the infants
born of the male's female partner typically were his genetic offspring,
selection for a disposition to support and sustain infants born from one's
176 For a fictional treatment of the situation of paternity fraud and the emotional fallout of
such fraud, see generally EDWARD DEANGELO, THE LIES THAT BIND (2001). I know of several
cases of this sort in which the putative father unsuccessfully struggled to stay in the life of the
child.
177 See text infra p. 61; see also supra note 44.
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female partner would enhance a male's inclusive fitness.1 78 However,
evidence indicates that men are far more likely to fulfill the social and
psychological roles associated with fatherhood for their genetic children
than for other, unrelated children. 179 The exact causal mechanisms are
still disputed. 180
V. MULTIPLE FATHERS?
"California law, like nature itself ... makes no provi-
sion for dual fatherhood" 181
Does the nature of paternity as a compound concept make it possi-
ble for one individual to have more than one father? Or, is the Supreme
Court correct when it declared that, California law, like "nature itself...
makes no provision for dual fatherhood."' 182 Either answer requires soci-
ety to engage in a bit of verbal legislation, at least with respect to penum-
bral cases. Yet, before addressing this question, it is worth noting that
even with a simple, unified conception of fatherhood, the denial of "dual
fatherhood" has not been as universal as the Court assumes.
The Barf tribe of Venezuela employs a notion of "partible pater-
nity."' 183 Natives of this tribe believe that a child is partly the child of
every man who had sexual intercourse with its mother during the preg-
nancy. 184 According to Ban belief, all of the men who had intercourse
with a mother at about the time of conception, or anytime during the
pregnancy, are fathers of the child.' 85 The husband is considered to be
the primary father, apparently by virtue of the presumption of having had
sexual intercourse with his wife more frequently than the other males. 186
Primary and secondary fathers owe social responsibilities to the children,
178 The point is that there is a distinction between the content of a disposition to act and
the effect of having a disposition with that content. A disposition that has as its content "nur-
turing the children of one's female partner" may have the effect of increasing a man's inclu-
sive fitness even where this effect is no part of the disposition. See POPENOE, supra note 46, at
177.
179 [T]here is ample evidence of men's reluctance to assume child support obliga-
tions to the offspring of other men .... [S]teprelationships, once established, are
much less satisfying to all parties than the corresponding genetic relationships, and
much more likely to erupt in violence. Stepfathers are discriminative in their mal-
treatment, sparing own offspring in the same household. The tensions characteristic
of steprelationships are cross-culturally ubiquitous.
Wilson & Daly, supra note 58, at 289 (citations omitted).
180 Id.
181 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989).
182 Id.
183 See generally Stephan Beckerman et al., The Bar Partible Paternity Project: Prelimi-
nary Results, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 164 (1998).
184 id. at 165.
185 Id.
186 Id.
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though there are variations in the diligence in which the secondary fa-
thers fulfill these responsibilities.18 7 Stephen Beckerman has shown that
the practice of partible paternity among the Barf is adaptive in the fol-
lowing respect: children with secondary fathers are 16% more likely than
single-fathered children to survive to their fifteenth birthdays. 88
While practices differ, at least eighteen South American cultures,
widely separated geographically, accept some version of partible pater-
nity. 189 Indigenous cultures in India and Polynesia also accept partible
paternity. 190 In light of this, the Supreme Court may have been a bit
parochial when it declared California's practice to be nature's own,191 at
least if this is intended to imply that no other social practice is possible or
feasible.
The idea of dividing paternity need not be based on false concep-
tions of the genesis of human life. In the early 20th Century, Denmark,
presumably without false beliefs about the development of the fetus, ap-
portioned a child support obligation among all men who had had inter-
course with the mother during the period when conception might have
taken place.' 92 These men were all equally the legal fathers of the child
under a concept called "corporate paternity."' 193 Denmark was appar-
ently motivated by a desire to ensure support for the child by dividing the
responsibility between all potential biological fathers rather than select-
ing one of these men over the others without sufficient basis for such
selection,' 94 or as often happened in other Western legal systems, leaving
the child unsupported because no single man confidently could be deter-
mined to be the biological father. 95 Regardless of the intent or the pub-
187 Id.
188 id. at 166; see also CULTURES OF MULTIPLE FATHERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
PARTIBLE PATERNITY IN LOWLAND SOUTH AMERICA (Stephan Beckerman & Paul Valentine
eds. 2002) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of partible paternity in various South
American societies).
189 Kim A. McDonald, Shared Paternity in South African Tribes Confounds Biologists
and Anthropologists, THE CHRON. HIGHER EDU., Apr. 9, 1999 at A19.
190 Sara Abdulla, More Than One Father Is Good For You, NAT. SCI. UPDATE (1999), at
http://www.nature.com/nsu/990204/990204-8.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
191 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989).
192 Sass, supra note 80, at 490.
193 Id.
194 Id. Stephen Sass describes an approach to the establishment of paternity that was
adopted by Hungary after World War II, under which the mother could simply choose one of
the men who could have bseen the biological father, and the state would impose a child sup-
port obligation on him despite the existence of other men who could also have been the father.
See id. at 470-7 I, 497. Sass also describes a proposed reform to German law-one that was
never enacted into law-under which the mother could name any of the possible fathers as the
father. This man would have an obligation of child support but he would also have a cause of
action against the other possible fathers. See id. at 471.
195 As those economists who are fond of insurance schemes would remind us, something
like the economic effect of corporate paternity could be gotten by randomly picking one of
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lic policy considerations that lie behind the theory of corporate paternity,
Denmark found a way of making provisions for dual [or triple, etc.]
fatherhood. 196
As reported by anthropologists, the aboriginal practice of partible
paternity is based on false beliefs about the genesis of infants.197 Plausi-
bly, the Danish practice of corporate paternity arose from the evidential
problems associated with establishing genetic paternity during the 20th
century.' 98 I do not propose undermining the idea of unified paternity
for either of these reasons. The Barf have it wrong. For children con-
ceived in the normal way, there is only one genetic father of a child. 199
The Danish were suffering from inadequate forensic technology. Now,
the capability exists to determine with practical certainty the paternity of
any child, provided genetic material from the child and the man who is
the genetic father is available. This does not, however, mean that pater-
nity is a unified concept.
We have seen that paternity can fragment, in the sense that its vari-
ous elements are instantiated in different men. Even the concept of a
biological father is fragmented into genetic and causal senses. Barring
exotic technologies, a child still has only one genetic father. However,
this person may not have engaged in any procreative act, natural or artifi-
cial, with the mother of the child and may not be causally responsible for
the creation of the child. Even if he is causally responsible, he may not
be morally responsible for the pregnancy. It is possible that a person
who is not the genetic father is causally and, also, morally responsible for
the creation of the new child. 2°° Finally, it is possible for individuals
these men on whom to impose the obligation and then allowing a market in paternity insur-
ance. Unless the insurance were based in a very fine-grained division of the market, it would
divide the risk over all insurance purchasers-presumably all sexually potent and active males
who act rationally in insuring themselves against this risk-rather than among the specific men
who could be fathers of a particular baby.
196 See generally Sass, supra note 192.
197 This need not be so. As seems always to be the case, a practice could survive the
refutation of the beliefs that fostered it initially. Furthermore, a similar practice could emerge
without the false beliefs. Science and Technology: Paternity Test, 350 THE ECONOMIST 74, 75
(1999).
198 Sass, supra note 80, at 490. It is even clearer in this case that the practice could be
supported for different reasons. In the first place, it could have been based quite self-con-
sciously on a theory of delict according to which all men who had sexual access to the mother
were equally guilty of a delict. Alternatively, if we think of pregnancy as a generally un-
wanted outcome of sex for unmarried couples-a risk of copulation-it may seem fairer to
apportion the costs of the undesired outcome among those taking the risk of producing it.
Though, of course, there are many other issues in play here, too.
199 But see Barritt et al., supra note 151, at 434 (explaining haploidization and the use of
artificial sperm) SILVER, supra note 152, at 180-90. Recombinant DNA technologies could
result in a child having genetic material from multiple men and women. See Barritt et al.,
supra note 151, at 434. In such cases, even the concept of a genetic father will be fragmented.
200 See S.F. v. State ex rel. T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
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who are not biological fathers, either in the genetic or causal sense to be
fathers in the social and psychological sense.
So, who is the real father? It is better not to ask the question that
way. What we want to know is what elements of the normative cluster-
the moral and legal rights and responsibilities of fatherhood-are
grounded on what elements of the descriptive cluster-the roles, rela-
tionships and properties that collectively comprise our stereotypical con-
cept of fatherhood. When we see that the roles, relationships, and
properties can come apart, we should be ready to acknowledge that the
rights and responsibilities can come apart, as well.
VI. SOME STEPS TOWARD CLARIFICATION
"[T]he values and norms that once reinforced the cul-
tural ideal of fatherhood have collapsed leaving the cul-
tural expression of fatherhood fragmented and
'decultured' "201
The legal concept of paternity need not fit perfectly with our ordi-
nary concept of paternity. One could hold that paternity law sets out to
define a sui generis sense of "paternity": legal paternity. For legal pur-
poses, one might claim, the father is the husband of the mother, or when
the mother is not married, the genetic father of the child. There is no
reason that the legal concept of a father must align with other, non-
specialized notions of fatherhood. The legal system has found it useful
to have a legal concept of a person that is rather different from our ordi-
nary concept of a person. It might also have purposes for defining an
entirely new concept of a father.
Whatever the merits of a legal definition of "father" that is stipula-
tive, this does not seem to be an accurate description of the way Anglo-
American legal systems have addressed the concept of paternity. The
marital presumption of paternity almost always includes exceptions for
instances when the husband can establish that he was sterile, impotent, or
away from the mother at the time of conception.20 2 These exceptions
make little sense unless one interprets the marital presumption as being
an attempt to resolve the question of genetic paternity, a question often
fraught with evidentiary difficulties and one that could be socially and
201 MARSIGLIO, supra note 1, at 151 (describing David Blankenhom's view in Fatherless
America).
202 Justice Scalia summarized the traditional exceptions to the marital presumption:
Traditionally, that presumption could be rebutted only by proof that a husband was
incapable of procreation or had had no access to his wife during the relevant period.
... As explained by Blackstone, nonaccess could only be proved "if the husband be
out of the kingdom of England (or, as the law somewhat loosely phrases it, extra
quatuor maria [beyond the four seas]) for above nine months.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989).
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interpersonally explosive. The history of paternity establishment appears
to be one in which presumptions about paternity are tied closely to the
biological facts about paternity. For example, the official principle on
which paternity was established has never been one of direct appeal to
the best interest of the child. Courts have always sought the man who is,
or is likely to be, the genetic (or causal) father.
It is possible to hold that the biological connection is unimportant-
that the law is free to continue to determine paternity by employing the
marital presumption or, more reasonably, by determining who functions
as the social father. This is not a savory presumption in most people's
eyes. 20 3 The frequency of mistaken or fraudulent attributions of pater-
nity, often estimated to occur in about 10% of cases, has put pressure on
legislatures and courts to give up the legal fiction implied in the marital
presumption in the face of the scientific fact established by DNA testing.
The best way to understand the legal notion of paternity is as an
attempt, in epistemically infertile territory, to determine genetic pater-
nity. The availability of extremely reliable, relatively low-cost DNA
tests for genetic relatedness has changed the epistemic terrain. It is now
possible to determine with a very high degree of certainty the paternity of
an individual with a sample of genetic material from the child and the
alleged father. This places the marital presumption on a collision course
with science. Moreover, recent events suggest that it is the marital pre-
sumption that is yielding to the juggernaut of scientific truth. 2°4
Suppose, as seems likely, that this trend continues. Where are we
left? Is the biological relationship all that matters in determining pater-
nity? Is genetic relatedness the basis on which all the rights and respon-
sibilities of fatherhood depend? I think it is not, but (as I will indicate
below) my reasons for this are not the usual ones.
In addressing these issues, it is important to remember that the an-
swers to questions of public policy, as well as the approaches to sound
judicial review, will improve if society unbundles the cluster of separable
concepts involved in paternity as well as those involved in the cluster of
paternal rights and responsibilities. Society must seek to ground sepa-
rately the individual rights and responsibilities fathers typically have by
virtue of their paternity in the individual sets of properties, roles and
203 The swift and nearly unanimous action of some of the state legislatures in enacting
paternity fraud legislation suggests that legislators perceive widespread support for grounding
legal paternity on scientific facts. See supra note 142. Feminist author Wendy Kaminer
seems to sum up popular sentiment when she says, "if a man is ordered to pay child support by
mistake, on the basis of inaccurate information or a knowingly false charge of paternity, fair-
ness demands that the mistake be acknowledged (and damn the consequences)." Wendy
Kaminer, Fathers in Court, AM. PROSPECr, Sept. 25, 2000, at 63.
204 See supra notes 140, 142 (citing new legislation concerning the disestablishment of
paternity based on genetic testing).
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relationships fathers typically have. What it is about fathers that grounds
an obligation to provide financial support for a child may be quite differ-
ent from the features, roles, or relationships that ground a right to associ-
ate with, or the right to rear, the child. This can be masked by the social
stereotype of a father, which fuses separable features, roles and relation-
ships in one concept and, thereby, inclines us to see these as inhering in
one man.
What happens by unbundling these elements in this conceptual
framework? The problems are not immediately solved by this concep-
tual reconstruction, but new and promising potential solutions present
themselves. Here are some suggestions for directions in which to de-
velop an account of paternity that is sufficient for legal purposes. 20 5
A. CHILD'S RIGHT TO FAMILY MEDICAL HISTORY
There is no generally recognized legal right for an individual to
have access to a family medical history even when such information is
available.206 This is unfortunate. I believe that there is a moral right to
this information and that this moral right ought to receive legal protec-
tion. As a result of advances in our medical knowledge, this genetic
information is increasingly important to an individual's health care. Fur-
thermore, the public and members of the legislature and the judiciary are
becoming more aware of the importance of this information. Both of
these changes are likely to increase pressure for legal recognition of a
right to a person's genetic information. If such a right is to be legally
recognized, it would create yet another purpose for establishing
paternity.
It is clear that a paternity determination for purposes of satisfying an
individual's right to know her family medical history requires us to iden-
tify the genetic father. No matter what. other elements there are in our
paradigm of paternity, or how these might eclipse genetic paternity for
other legal purposes, it is the genetic relationship that matters for these
purposes.
Is the father more than a sperm donor? Yes, of course. But not for
purposes of satisfying a child's right to have access to his family medical
history. For these purposes, the father is precisely a sperm donor. This
205 These suggestions are not adequately defended here. For a fuller development and
defense of these suggestions, see Donald Hubin, Parsing Paternity: The Legal and Philosophi-
cal Foundations of Fatherhood (2003) (manuscript on file).
206 In fact, there is strong precedent in the Supreme Court for recognizing a constitutional
right to conceal one's medical history. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977); Ander-
son v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995). Courts have ruled, however, that there are
times where a countervailing interest may outweigh the parent's rights to privacy. See John-
son v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1069-70 (Cal. 2nd Ct. App. 2000) (determining
that adoptee's interests outweighed sperm donor's limited privacy interests in medical history).
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does not mean, however, that this man is the father for other legal
purposes.
B. RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
Perhaps everyone has a moral responsibility to provide for children
who are in need. Nevertheless, it is commonly accepted that parents
have a special responsibility to provide for their children. As discussed
earlier, ensuring that this responsibility is discharged has long been one
of the primary purposes for making a legal determination of paternity.
The theory of descent suggests that a paternity determination for
purposes of establishing a support obligation should, like a determination
for establishing a medical history, be determined solely by the genetic
relation between the man and the child. The widespread and rapidly
growing use of DNA testing to conclusively establish an obligation to
support a child and, more recently, to disestablish such an obligation
clearly suggests this view.20 7
As attractive as this view might appear, on reflection it seems obvi-
ously wrong. It is plausible to think that the responsibility to provide
financially for a child depends on the causal role an adult plays in the
creation of the new life under conditions that render the adult morally
responsible for the specific procreative consequence of his or her ac-
tions.208 Though these conditions are special in the sense that they are
restrictive-not all imaginable instances of human conception satisfy
them-they are the typical conditions of human conception.
I call this the "causal theory of responsibility for support" and dis-
tinguish it from the theory of descent, which is a genetic theory of re-
sponsibility for support. In a way, one could think of the causal theory as
reincorporating one element of the delict theory. Like the delict theory,
the causal theory of responsibility for support focuses attention on the
actions of the father. The crucial element for establishing such a respon-
sibility for support is a voluntary action of the father and not, as the
theory of descent holds, a genetic relationship between the man and the
child. But the causal theory is not a version of the standard theory of
delict. The causal theory of responsibility for support is not, for exam-
ple, committed to holding that extramarital (including premarital) sex is a
criminal offense, a tort, or even a moral wrong. However, it is motivated
by the thought that it is at least prima facie wrong for a person to volun-
207 On this view, the marital presumption is merely an epistemic crutch to assist us in
determining who is the genetic father. Absent proof of Justice Cardozo's "sordid facts" that
defeat the marital presumption, we will presume that the husband of the mother is the genetic
father of the child. hz re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 473-74 (N.Y. 1930).
208 This is not the only way a person could incur a special obligation to support a child.
Adoption provides another clear instance of incurring a special obligation to support a child.
SILVER, supra note 152, at 136-37.
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tarily engage in an action he knows, or should know, might result in the
creation of a dependent human life and, then, not to support that child
should it come to be. The requirement to support a child you cause to
come into existence is not, as the traditional theory of delict holds, a
punishment for "illicit sexual intercourse" or even for a wrongful act of
bringing the child into existence. 20 9 Rather, the causal theory treats it
like the obligation to repay a debt. Taking out a loan is not a delict.
Failure to repay a loan is. On the causal theory, fathering a child as a
result of voluntarily engaging in conduct that one knows, or should
know, might cause a child to come into existence is not, in itself, a delict.
Willful failure to support a child one caused to exist typically is.
Clearly the causal theory of responsibility for support needs a much
more thorough defense than this commentary provides. 210 My purpose
here is only to suggest a plausible approach to grounding an obligation to
support a child-one that shows how, for legal purposes, the various
elements of paradigmatic paternity can come apart, and how the obliga-
tion to support a child may plausibly be grounded on an element other
than genetic paternity.
One apparent objection to the causal theory proceeds by appealing
to our practice of establishing child support obligations based on DNA
testing. While we could declare this practice fundamentally misguided,
such a conclusion seems unacceptable. But if the responsibility for sup-
porting a child is not based on the genetic relationship between the man
and the child, what is the justification for employing DNA testing to
establish support obligations? The answer is obvious. It is the same jus-
tification we have for using fingerprint information (or DNA informa-
tion, for that matter) in determining the perpetrator of a murder, for
example. The fingerprint on the murder weapon (or the DNA material at
the crime scene) is not the fact that constitutes guilt. It is, rather, evi-
dence of the fact that constitutes guilt. Similarly, that a child is the ge-
netic offspring of a man is evidence-and very compelling evidence in
any ordinary situation-that the man engaged in an action that caused the
child to come into existence. Typically such actions are voluntary and
the man knows, or should know, that they can lead to pregnancy. How-
ever, certainty about the genetic relationship does not entail certainty
about the fact that is constitutive of fathering a child in the sense that is
209 See SAss, supra note 80, at 469 (interpreting the delict as that of engaging in illicit
intercourse with the mother). I know of no development of the theory of delict that interprets
the delict as that of creating a child, but that is a logically possible development of a theory of
delict. The causal theory of responsibility for support does not locate the delict in either the
act of sexual intercourse or the act of procreation.
210 See Donald Hubin, Parsing Paternity: The Legal Foundations of Fatherhood (2003)
(manuscript on file), for such a defense.
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relevant to having an obligation to support the child. A variety of cases,
both real and hypothetical, demonstrate this adequately. 2 1'
C. RIGHT TO ESTABLISH A "PARENT/CHILD RELATIONSHIP" WITH A
CHILD
Where paternity is not fragmented in fact, we believe that fathers
have a right to establish a parent/child relationship with their children.
Our concern for the best interest of the child does not give us license to
prevent a biological father who is willing and able to act as a father from
doing so. Increasingly, this is being recognized outside the marital con-
text; the right of a biological father to establish such a relationship with
his child and for the child to establish that relationship with his biological
father has been extended to cases where neither the father nor the mother
is married. 21 2 Furthermore, despite the reasoning of the Court in Michael
H., courts have been increasingly willing to recognize a right of biologi-
cal father to develop a relationship with his natural child even when the
mother is married to another man. 21 3
In doing so, they have not distinguished between two aspects of
biological paternity: genetic and causal. It is not my purpose to argue
whether either, neither or both of these elements of biological paternity
ground a right to establish a parent/child relationship with a child. In-
stead, I want to show that because these are separable elements from
each other and from the other elements of paternity, it is possible, ex
ante, to give any combination of answers to these questions. One might
hold that the right to establish a relationship with the child is grounded
only on the genetic relationship, or only on the causal responsibility for
the child's life, or on the conjunction of these, or on each of these indi-
vidually or on neither of these, or on one (or both) of these in conjunc-
tion with some other element of paternity.
The question of what grounds a right on the part of a child to estab-
lish a parent/child relationship with an adult, and conversely, what
21 1 See supra Part II1.
212 In a 1998 case, for example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia wrote,
The instant a child is born, both unwed biological parents have a right to establish a
parent-child relationship with their child. To preserve his parental interest vis-A-vis
his newborn child, an unwed biological father must, upon learning of the existence
of his child, demonstrate his commitment to assume the responsibilities of
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the care, rearing, and support of his
newborn child and by commencing to establish a meaningful parent-child relation-
ship with his child.
Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1998).
213 See, e.g., In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1994) (holding that denying a man, who
claims to be the child's biological father, an opportunity to rebut the marital presumption or to
claim parental rights by establishing paternity, violates due course of law guarantee under the
State Constitution).
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grounds such a right on the part of the adult in question must be an-
swered by looking at the legitimate interests of the parties. The follow-
ing is an example of how such an argument might proceed. As was
noted earlier, 214 there are potential medical benefits that accrue to both
the 'genetic father and his child not only from a proper identification of
this genetic relationship, but also from the establishment of a parent/child
relationship. Children having such a relationship are more likely to re-
ceive a needed organ donation from their biological father or one of his
relatives. Given the fact that organ donation can go from a child to a
parent, the genetic father would also have such an interest. These inter-
ests may form the basis for arguing that the right to establish a parent/
child relationship with a child arises from the genetic relationship itself
(though, perhaps, it also has other sources).
On the other hand, one could imagine a man, rendered sterile by
chemotherapy or radiation therapy, receiving a transplant of testicular
tissue from another man. Imagine this man has sexual relations with a
woman with the intention of causing a pregnancy and being a father to
the child. One would think that this man has a legitimate interest in
developing a parent/child relationship with the child and, perhaps, a right
based on that interest. The fact that the man would not be the genetic
father would not undermine the consideration for such a right.
It is possible that more than one man has a right to develop a parent/
child relationship with a child, pronouncements of the Supreme Court
notwithstanding. Thus, in cases where the various elements of paternity
are separated, the child may have a right to a parent/child relationship
with multiple men, and vice versa.215 To insist that only one man can
fulfill this role on the grounds that in our stereotypical cases there is only
one father, is to attempt to pound a square peg into a round hole.
Clearly, the problematic cases we have been discussing are not typical.
Simple answers will not do for complex cases.
D. RIGHT TO "PARENT" A CHILD2 16
Children need much more than financial support to have happy,
healthy, secure childhoods and develop into productive, responsible,
well-adjusted adults. They need love, discipline, and education. They
need to have their physical and mental abilities challenged, their compas-
sion developed, their sense of right and wrong honed. These are tasks
214 See supra Part I.A.I.
215 The same is true of women: in certain situations, a child may have the right to develop
a parent/child relationship with two women, and they with the child. SILVER, supra note 152,
at 133-38.
216 To my ear, "parent," as used as a verb, is a neologism that grates on the ear; but
"custody" (applied to children who are not incarcerated) is an anachronistic barbarism that
offends decency and reinforces a proprietary attitude toward children.
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that are, in Western cultures, traditionally handled by parents-fathers
and mothers-in an intact family within the context of a supportive
community.
Alternative approaches to raising children have been proposed by
some philosophical luminaries from Plato217 to Marx. 218 Many of these
proposals are motivated by legitimate moral concerns such as the desire
to promote social equality, protect children, diminish the degree to which
gender roles determine one's life prospects, and so forth. As a remedy
for these problems, the proposal to abolish the family as a unit for rearing
children may appear to some to "stand to reason." As is often the case,
though, what stands to reason falls to experience. Attempts to abolish
the family unit for the rearing of children have not led to desirable
results.
Our traditional conception of a nuclear family involves a man and
woman living with children who are both their genetic children and
whom they caused to exist. In such cases, one has no difficulty in decid-
ing who the father is, and, absent extraordinary features of the situation,
this man is the only man with paternal rights and responsibilities. In
these cases, the conceptual problems of paternity are hidden from view
given our practical concerns. The cases that we are concerned with here,
however, are not of this sort. They are cases in which the semantic com-
plexity of the concept of paternity is manifest because our practical con-
cerns cannot be met by relying on our stereotypical conceptions.
I think that the right to function as a parent to a child depends on
one having an established parent/child relationship and its being consis-
tent with the child's well-being for one to function in this capacity. This
approach makes the right to function as a parent to a child depend on the
factors that give an adult the right to establish a parent/child relationship
with the child. (Conversely, the right of a child to be parented by an
adult depends on the factors that give the child a right to establish a
parent/child relationship with the adult.)
Establishing this dependency does little to solve the problems we
are ultimately concerned with here. Again, though, it is not my current
purpose to defend any specific answer to questions about the basis of
various rights and responsibilities of paternity. Rather, I seek only to
show that these need not be unified in one person and that, even with
217 In The Republic, Plato says, "All these women are to belong to all these men in com-
mon, and no woman is to live privately with any man. And the children, in their turn, will be
in common, and neither will a parent know his own offspring, nor a child his parent." PLATO,
THE REPUBLIC 457 (Allan Bloom ed., 1968).
218 See Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in SELECTED
WORKS IN ONE VOLUME 49-53 (International Publishers, New York 1968).
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respect to a single paternal right or responsibility concerning an individ-
ual child, it may be held by more than one man.
CONCLUSION
The above arguments and considerations may be frustratingly in-
conclusive when one focuses directly on our practical concerns with es-
tablishing, or disestablishing, paternity. I have said very little about what
grounds parental rights and how to solve the pressing practical problems
society is trying to address with paternity determinations. I have ges-
tured toward promising lines of argument addressing these issues, but
done little to pursue them here. Rather, I have engaged in what seems to
me to be a conceptual precondition to progress on these questions. My
intention has been to show that such progress is more likely if we can
manage to separate the various paternal rights and responsibilities and
seek independent grounding for each on one or more of the properties,
roles or relationships of fathers.
This conceptual dissection is necessary because the concept of pa-
ternity is, despite initial appearances, extremely complex. Social and
technological changes have conspired to make the conceptual complexity
of paternity of practical importance. The pressing practical problems one
seeks to solve by attributions of paternity will be solved only by recog-
nizing the complexity of the concept and adjusting our legal and social
norms to reflect a morally justifiable grounding of the various rights and
responsibilities of paternity on the various properties, roles, and relation-
ships that constitute paternity.
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